Ionising radiation dose calculations for the release of 131I during accident conditions at the SAFARI-1 materials test reactor by Bekker, Willem Adriaan
  
 
 
IONISING  RADIATION  DOSE  CALCULATIONS 
FOR  THE  RELEASE  OF  131I 
DURING  ACCIDENT  CONDITIONS 
AT THE SAFARI-1 MATERIALS  TEST  REACTOR 
 
 
 
 
 
Willem Adriaan Bekker 
 
 
 
 
A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Science, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Science. 
 
School of Physics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Johannesburg, 2010 
 
 ii
DECLARATION 
I declare that this research report is my own, unaided work.  It is being submitted for the 
Degree of Master of Science in the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.  It 
has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university.  
 
_______________________________________ 
Willem Bekker 
 
 
 
11 October 2010 
 
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
This study demonstrates how the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) radiation transport 
code can be used as a contribution to the family of Safety Analysis tools for Research 
Reactors.  Since Research Reactors are used worldwide over a wide range of research 
and commercial applications it can be justified that effort must be spent to improve on 
safety analysis.  While the advantages of these installations to society are widely 
recognized, it is still necessary that safety analysis provides the necessary assurance that 
these installations do not cause an undue risk to society.  A Materials Test Reactor 
(MTR) is used as an example to describe the Safety Analysis steps that need to be done, 
limited to the reactor and its building.  A radioactive inventory in the reactor core is 
determined.  For further evaluation of the effects of the release due to a hypothetical 
accident in such a reactor, the 131I radioisotope is chosen to demonstrate the capabilities 
of the MCNP code.  A 131I cloud resulting from the release is simulated together with an 
MCNP model of the reactor building.  Personnel in the proximity of the 131I cloud for 
short times, either due to emergency actions or accidental entrapment, are also 
modelled.  The external photon whole-body doses and β-decay (electron) skin doses are 
determined.  The MCNP code results are also benchmarked against another method.  
The findings show that the method presented in the study could be used to pre-
determine emergency actions that could be incorporated into emergency planning and 
even into design of a new research reactor.  This is substantiated by the conclusion that 
only the external photon dose could result in unacceptable doses above 500 mSv for 
short exposure times.   The study concludes that the MCNP code can be used effectively 
for Safety Analyses and leaves the opportunity open to expand the use of the code to 
other fields related to research reactors.  
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GLOSSARY  
Activity The number of nuclei in a sample undergoing radioactive decay 
in each second expressed in becquerel (Bq) where 1 Bq is equal 
to 1 disintegration per second.  Also see radioactivity. 
Bremsstrahlung Bremsstrahlung is the continuous spectrum of electromagnetic 
radiation generated when charged particles, e.g. electrons, are 
slowed down by matter.  When a fast moving electron passes 
close to a nucleus, the strong attractive coulomb force causes the 
electron to deviate from its original path and loose its energy, 
causing electromagnetic radiation (X-ray photons) to be emitted. 
Cross Section Denoted by σ.  The probability of a specific interaction of 
radiation with matter  with  units  of  barns  per  atom  
(1 barn = 10-24 cm2).  Used in Fig. 2.11.  Also see linear 
attenuation coefficient and mass attenuation coefficient. 
Deterministic 
health effects 
Health effects that have a severity that is dependent on dose and 
only starting to occur above threshold level.  These is effects are 
associated with large amounts of radiation received by a person, 
e.g. in an emergency or accident situation.  In contrast, 
Stochastic health effects occur without a threshold level, has a 
probability proportional to the dose received and is associated 
with low doses. 
Dose The quantity of radiation absorbed, specifically in energy per 
unit mass, expressed in sievert (Sv) or gray (Gy). 
Linear attenuation 
coefficient 
Denoted by µ. The probability of a specific interaction of 
radiation  with  matter  in units of cm-1.  To convert from σ to µ; 
σ in cm2 / per  atom  is  multiplied  with  the number of atoms 
(in atoms / cm3) to get the linear attenuation coefficient (µ) for a 
given material.  Also see cross section and mass attenuation 
coefficient. 
Mass attenuation 
coefficient 
Denoted by µ/ρ or µm.  Obtained by dividing µ with the mass 
density (ρ) of the absorbing medium to get µm in cm2/g.  This is 
a convenient quantity to use since it is essentially independent of 
the density and physical state of the absorbing medium.  Used in 
Fig. 2.12.  Also see cross section and linear attenuation 
coefficient. 
Negative 
temperature 
coefficient  
An attribute of reactor design that causes the fission reaction to 
slow down as the temperature increases and stabilizes reactor 
operations. 
Radioactivity The spontaneous emission of radiation from a nucleus decaying 
to a lower energy state. 
Specific Activity  The Activity (in Bq) per unit mass. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Research reactors are used effectively worldwide for a wide range of research and 
commercial applications.  Careful safety analysis has to be performed to provide 
assurance that these installations are operated safely, and thereby not cause an undue 
risk to society.  Modern computational techniques are used in safety analysis. For this 
study, a specific computational technique, the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) 
transport code, was evaluated and used for effective contribution to the ongoing 
development of safety analysis.   
In this chapter, an overview of research reactors and their uses will be given and, 
thereafter, more details on the need for safety analysis will be provided.  Thereafter, the 
development of modern computational techniques used in safety analysis will be 
discussed and the specific field where the MCNP code will be used and evaluated, will 
be defined.  This will be followed by a brief discussion of the methodology followed. 
 
1.1 Research Reactors 
An overview on research reactors is given in this Section by elaborating on the different 
types thereof and their purposes and uses. 
 
1.1.1 Definition and uses  
Research reactors form part of the family of nuclear reactors, but are normally not used 
for the production of electricity like nuclear power plants.  In nuclear power plants the 
energy produced by the nuclear reaction is used for generation of electricity.  In research 
reactors the emphasis falls on utilising the neutrons produced for useful applications.  
Whilst some of the neutrons produced in the nuclear reaction are used to sustain the 
nuclear reaction taking place in the reactor core, other neutrons are used in or outside 
the reactor core to e.g. bring into effect the desired changes in isotopic composition of 
the materials exposed to the neutron flux.    
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The different ways and timeframes in which materials can be exposed to the neutron 
flux from the reactor core result in a variety of applications.  Therefore, research 
reactors have a wide range of uses.  These include analysis and testing of materials, and 
production of radioisotopes. Their capabilities are applied in many fields, within the 
nuclear industry as well as in fusion research, environmental science, advanced 
materials development, drug design and nuclear medicine.  Since such scientific 
facilities are expensive, research reactors tend to be multi-purpose, and many have been 
operating for more than 30 years.  As a result, the variety of designs and the various 
ways in which each type can be utilised increase the complexity of safety analysis.  This 
will be discussed later in more detail. 
In general, the purpose of nuclear research reactors is not for energy generation; the 
maximum power generated generally never exceeds 100 MW. They are commonly 
devoted to the generation of neutrons for different scientific and other purposes of 
societal benefit. However, high power densities are involved in the core and specific 
features are necessary to ensure safe utilisation of these installations [TEW08].   
 
1.1.2 Categories and quantities  
A particular research reactor can be used for many purposes and a great variety of types 
and designs do exist.  In contrast, the majority (80%) of the world’s nuclear power 
plants’ designs are of only two similar types, Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs) and 
Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs).   
Research reactors are broadly classified into a few categories, according to their type of 
design and use. The first category is reactors that are used for research, and of which 
some are also used for commercial applications, namely the production of radioisotopes.   
About 160 reactors fall into this category.  Other reactors are called Test Reactors (23), 
Training Facilities (37) and Prototypes (2).  One research reactor produces electricity.  
A special type of research reactor, called a “critical assembly”, also exists, of which 
there are 60 worldwide.   
Russia has most of the research reactors (62), followed by the USA (54), Japan (18), 
France (15), Germany (14) and China (13). Many smal
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have research reactors, including Bangladesh, Algeria, Colombia, Ghana, Jamaica, 
Libya, Thailand and Vietnam. About 20 more research reactors are planned or under 
construction, and 361 have been shut down or decommissioned, about half of these in 
the USA. Many research reactors were built in the 1960s and 1970s. The peak number 
of reactors that operated was in 1975, with 373 in 55 countries.  Thereafter an increasing 
number began to be shut down.     
 
1.1.3 Research reactor types and designs  
The operation of all the types of reactors will not be explained.  However, to understand 
the model developed for this study, the operation of a few types are explained below. 
Tank-in-pool type reactor 
The tank-in-pool type research reactor is a vessel situated in a large pool of water.  
Inside the reactor vessel is the reactor core, consisting of a cluster of fuel elements.  The 
pool water supplies radiation shielding on the top of the reactor tank, while the thick 
concrete walls of the pool provides shielding to the sides of the reactor.  High-density 
concrete is normally used. 
Shown in Fig. 1.1 is a simplified representation of a tank-in-pool type research reactor.   
The reactor vessel is also called a tank, hence the name “tank-in-pool type”. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Simplified representation of a tank-in-pool type reactor. 
Contrete pool walls 
(shielding)
Pool Water
Reactor Vessel
Reactor Core 
(containing 
fuel elements)
A A
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Among the fuel elements are control rods that control the nuclear fission chain reaction.  
A high neutron flux exists in the core and therefore some in-core devices that utilise this 
high flux, are put in empty channels among the fuel elements, for example materials to 
undergo isotopic composition change.  Both graphite and beryllium is commonly used 
for neutron reflectors.  Shown in Fig. 1.2 is a representation of a cut through the 
SAFARI-1 reactor core, as an example, as indicated by Section A-A in Fig. 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.2: Section through the SAFARI-1 reactor core at position A-A of Fig. 1.1, 
showing the core components. 
 
Each fuel element comprises several, typically between 18 and 21, curved or flat 
aluminium-clad fuel plates, and is shown schematically in Fig. 1.3.  The fuel element 
assembly is rectangular and is placed vertically in the core. 
In addition to the shielding function provided by the water, it also both moderates and 
cools the reactor.  The water flowing through the reactor core goes through the fuel 
elements in order to ensure that heat generated in the fuel element is taken away.  
Efficient flow is ensured by means of a primary water loop that pumps water through 
the core. 
Another way of utilising the neutrons is to access the core from outside the biological 
shield (the concrete wall of the pool).  Pipes that penetrate through the wall of the pool 
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Figure 1.3: Schematic representation of vertical fuel element assembly. 
 
provide access to the core for experimental devices.  These pipes are called beam tubes.  
Collimators are fitted within the beam tubes and direct the neutrons to experimental 
devices outside the pool wall.  When the beam tubes are not in use they are filled with 
water to provide shielding to the outside of the pool.  Worldwide, there are about 32 
research reactors of the tank-in-pool type design. 
Pool type reactor  
The pool type reactor is very similar to the tank-in-pool type design.  The major 
difference is that the reactor core is a cluster of fuel elements sitting in the reactor pool, 
but without a reactor vessel.  The main reason is that less cooling is needed and the 
cooling provided by the water in the pool is sufficient.  This is possible because these 
reactors run at lower power, typically in the region of kWs and not in tens of MWs as 
for tank-in-pool type reactors.  About 67 research reactors worldwide are of the pool 
type design.   
TRIGA reactor  
In another common design, the TRIGA, the reactor core consists of 60-100 cylindrical 
fuel elements which are about 36 mm in diameter.  The fuel elements are enclosed in 
aluminium cladding and contain a mixture of uranium fuel and zirconium hydride 
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moderator.  The reactor sits in a pool of water and generally uses graphite or beryllium 
as a reflector.  This kind of reactor can safely be pulsed to very high power levels (e.g. 
25 000 MW) for fractions of a second.  Its fuel gives the TRIGA type reactor a very 
strong negative temperature coefficient, and the rapid increase in power is quickly cut 
short by a negative reactivity effect of the hydride moderator.  About 40 research 
reactors worldwide are of this type of design. 
Other research reactor designs  
Other research reactor designs are moderated by heavy water (12 units worldwide) or 
graphite.  A few are fast reactors, which require no moderator and can use a mixture of 
uranium and plutonium as fuel.  Homogenous type reactors have a core comprising a 
solution of uranium salts as a liquid, contained in a tank about 300 mm in diameter.  
The simple design made them popular early on, but in 2009 only five remained in 
operation. 
 
1.1.4 Materials Test Reactor (MTR) used in this study 
The reactor type investigated in this study is a tank-in-pool Materials Test Reactor 
(MTR).  MTRs were originally built to test the behaviour under irradiation of materials 
to be used in Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs).  The flux in a research reactor is about two 
orders of magnitude higher than in NPPs and, therefore, accelerated tests can be done on 
materials to be used for construction in NPPs.   
The example South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA) MTR investigated is 
a 20 MW research reactor and was built in the 1960s following the so-called “Oak 
Ridge design”.  Similar reactors were built more or less at the same time in the USA at 
Oak Ridge, in Sweden, the Netherlands and South Africa.  A modern type of reactor 
that is very similar is the OPAL reactor in Australia.   
 
1.2 Need for Safety Analysis  
In the introductory paragraph it was mentioned, and through Section 1.1 explained, that 
research reactors with all their uses are highly valued installations and hold a lot of 
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advantage to society.  It is, therefore, worth considering that such installations continue 
operating or to even allow new research reactors to be built.  Before the continued 
operation of research reactors or construction of new ones is going to be coupled to 
Safety Analysis, the Fundamental Safety Principles of the IAEA [IAE06] and the 
“system of radiological protection” will be discussed.      
  
1.2.1 Fundamental Safety Principles 
When the Fundamental Safety Principles no. SF-1 [IAE06] was approved for 
publication by the IAEA's Board of Governors in September 2006, the IAEA has 
succeeded in formulating for the first time a unified philosophy of nuclear safety and 
protection against ionizing radiation with a broad international consensus.   
The development of the Fundamental Safety Principles was initiated in June 1995 by 
the IAEA Board with the aim of combining three fundamental safety texts viz. “the 
safety of nuclear installations”, the “safety of radioactive waste management” and 
“protection and the safety of radiation sources”.  The three different areas were 
considered and consolidated into a coherent and consistent set of ten principles.  This 
publication is the highest in the three tier hierarchy of IAEA safety standards which 
comprises in decreasing order Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety 
Guides. 
The IAEA is required by its statute to promote international cooperation.  This is 
motivated by the fact that radiation risks may transcend national borders, and that 
international cooperation serves to promote and enhance safety globally.  International 
cooperation is fostered by promoting exchanging of experience and by improving 
capabilities to control hazards, to prevent accidents, to respond to emergencies and to 
mitigate any harmful consequences.    
 
The definition of safety of facilities and activities 
The Fundamental Safety Principles publication defines “safety” as the protection of 
people and the environment against radiation risks, and the safety of facilities and 
activities that give rise to radiation risks.  Safety of facilities and activities includes the 
safety of nuclear installations, radiation safety, the safety of radioactive waste 
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management and safety in the transport of radioactive material.  It includes both 
radiation risks due to normal operating conditions and to accident conditions.   
Protection of people, as stated above, includes protection of an occupationally exposed 
worker and the public. 
The safety principles are applicable, as relevant, throughout the entire lifetime of all 
facilities and activities — existing and new — utilised for peaceful purposes, and to 
protective actions to reduce existing radiation risks.   
 
Fundamental safety objective and the ten safety principles 
The fundamental safety objective of the IAEA reflected in this publication is to protect 
people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation without unduly 
limiting the operation of facilities or the conduct of activities that give rise to radiation 
risks.  In order to achieve this safety objective, ten safety principles have been 
formulated, and they are as follows; 
Principle 1:   Responsibility for safety  
The first fundamental principle states that the prime responsibility for safety must 
rest with the person or organization responsible for facilities and activities that 
give rise to radiation risks.  The regulatory body, established according to 
Principle 2, grants an authorization to an organization known as the licensee.  The 
licensee retains the prime responsibility for safety throughout the lifetime of 
facilities and activities and plays an important role in the implementation of 
Principles 3 to 10 by means of aspects as leadership and the implementation of 
effective safety management systems. 
Principle 2:  Role of government:   
The second principle states that an effective legal and governmental framework 
for safety, including an independent regulatory body, must be established and 
sustained.  A proper legal and governmental framework provides for the clear 
assignment of responsibilities to safety.  The government is responsible to adopt 
its national legal system to make provision for legislation related to safety that 
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fulfils the objectives of the fundamental principles.  Programmes must be 
undertaken to achieve the safety of facilities and activities. 
Principle 3:  Leadership and management for safety 
Effective leadership and management for safety must be established and sustained 
in organizations concerned with, and facilities and activities that give rise to, 
radiation risks.  Leadership in safety matters has to be demonstrated at the highest 
levels in an organization.  This has to be achieved by an effective management 
system which has to integrate all elements of management including safety, 
quality, security and human performance. The management system also has to 
ensure the promotion of a safety culture. 
Principle 4:  Justification of facilities and activities  
“Justification” is also the first of three principles that makes up the “system of 
radiological protection”.  These principles, the other two being “Optimization” and 
Dose Limitation”, correspond in broad terms to “Principle 5” and “Principle 6”, 
respectively.  Therefore, these three principles will be discussed in more detail in 
the next section (Section 1.2.2).   
In summary, Justification requires that facilities and activities that give rise to 
radiation risks must yield an overall benefit which means that the benefits that 
nuclear installations or other facilities and activities yield must outweigh the 
radiation risks to which they give rise.   
Principle 5:  Optimization of protection 
Protection must be optimized to provide the highest level of safety that can 
reasonably be achieved.  The safety measures that are applied to facilities and 
activities that give rise to radiation risks are considered optimized if they provide 
the highest level of safety that can reasonably be achieved throughout the lifetime 
of the facility or activity, without unduly limiting its utilisation.  To determine 
whether radiation risks are As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA), all such 
risks, whether arising from normal operations or from abnormal or accident 
conditions, must be assessed prior to and, periodically, during the lifetime of 
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facilities and activities.  As stated above, this principle will also be discussed 
further in Section 1.2.2. 
Principle 6:  Limitation of risks to individuals 
Measures for controlling radiation risks must ensure that no individual bears an 
unacceptable risk or harm.  The application of the principles of Justification and 
Optimization of protection alone do not guarantee this. Consequently, doses and 
radiation risks must be controlled within specified limits.  The principle of “Dose 
Limitation” is discussed in Section 1.2.2. 
Principle 7:  Protection of present and future generations 
People and the environment, present and future, must be protected against 
radiation risks.  The effects of radiation exposure on human health (workers and 
public) are better understood than these of radiation exposure to the environment 
and measures must be taken to limit adverse radiation exposure to the 
environment. 
Radiation risks may also transcend national borders and may persist for long 
periods of time. The possible consequences, now and in the future, of current 
actions have to be taken into account in judging the adequacy of measures to 
control radiation risks. As an example, the generation of radioactive waste must be 
kept to the minimum and it must be managed in such a way as to avoid imposing 
an undue burden on future generations. 
Principle 8:  Prevention of accidents 
The most harmful consequences arising from facilities and activities have come 
from the loss of control over nuclear reactor cores (e.g. Chernobyl [WIL08]), 
nuclear chain reactions (inadvertent criticality) and overexposure due to the 
misuse of a radioactive source or other source of radiation.   Therefore, all 
practical efforts must be made to prevent and mitigate nuclear or radiation 
accidents and measures have to be taken to ensure that the likelihood of an 
accident having harmful consequences is extremely low.  
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The primary means of preventing and mitigating the consequences of accidents is 
through a concept called “defence in depth”.  Defence in depth is implemented 
primarily through the combination of a number of consecutive and independent 
levels of protection that would have to fail before harmful effects could be caused 
to people or to the environment.  If one level of protection or barrier were to fail, 
the subsequent level or barrier would be available.   The concept of defence in 
depth and how it is applied play an important role in the effectiveness of the 
protection measures mentioned in Section 2.4.4. 
Principle 9:  Emergency preparedness and response 
This principle requires that arrangements must be made for emergency 
preparedness and response for nuclear or radiation accidents.  Prior assessment for 
the need of defined emergency actions must be done for emergency preparedness.   
The primary goals of emergency preparedness are: 
• To ensure that arrangements are in place for an effective response to a nuclear 
or radiation emergency. 
• To ensure that, for reasonably foreseeable incidents, radiation risks would be 
minor, 
• For any accidents that do occur, to take practical measures to mitigate any 
consequences for human life and health and the environment. 
Principle 10: Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks 
Radiation risks may arise in situations other than in facilities and activities that are 
in compliance with regulatory control. In such situations, if the radiation risks are 
relatively high, consideration has to be given to whether protective actions can 
reasonably be taken to reduce radiation exposures and to remediate adverse 
conditions.  In all of these cases, the protective actions considered each have some 
foreseeable economic, social and, possibly, environmental costs and may entail 
some radiation risks (e.g. to workers carrying out these protective actions) and 
must be carefully considered. 
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Conclusion on the discussion of Fundamental Safety Principles 
The objective of the Fundamental Safety Principles publication and its ten principles 
provides an overview of the important concepts jointly related to nuclear safety and 
radiation protection.  The need for Safety Analysis and the principles of applying it are 
reflected in the ten principles.  An earlier scheme, but closely related to the above 
principles, the “system of radiological protection” is going to be discussed next, in view 
of further understanding the need for Safety Analysis. 
 
1.2.2 System of Radiological Protection  
A system of radiological protection has been defined by the International Commission 
on Radiological Protection (ICRP), an international organization that brings out various 
publications on radiation protection1.   The “System of radiological protection” involves 
three fundamental principles; justification, optimization and dose limitation.  
Justification 
Although the newest ICRP publication in this series, ICRP 103 [ICR07], replaced the 
previous document, ICRP 60 [ICR90], some aspects of relevance in the latter document 
will first be mentioned and explained, especially in respect of justification. 
ICRP 60 [ICR90] stated that “due to some human activities, an increase in overall 
exposure to radiation will occur”.  These human activities were defined as “Practices”.  
For proposed and continued Practices, the ICRP stated that “no Practice should be 
introduced, unless it produces sufficient benefit to the exposed individuals or to society 
to offset the radiation detriment it causes”, i.e. “it should aim to do more good than 
harm”.  This principle was called “Justification of a practice”.  ICRP 60 [ICR90] also 
defined “intervention” which is an action to reduce exposure in existing situations.   
In ICRP 103 [ICR07], the ICRP did not indicate that any fundamental change should be 
introduced to the system of radiological protection as defined in ICRP 60 [ICR90].  It 
                                                 
1
 For the purpose of this study, and also internationally accepted, “radiation protection” and “radiological 
protection” are the same.   Therefore, with introducing the system of radiation protection the words are 
used interchangeably.  While ICRP refers to “radiological protection”, this study refers to “radiation 
protection” in most cases. 
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should be noted though that the terms “Practices” and “intervention” have been replaced 
by “controllable exposure situations”, which are now defined as “planned”, 
“emergency” and “existing” exposure situations.  Therefore, strictly speaking, it is not 
correct any more to speak of “Justification of a practice”, but “justification” still applies 
and it could be mentioned in terms of keeping an existing research reactor running.   
ICRP 103 [ICR07] defines “justification” as “any decision that alters the radiological 
exposure situation should do more good than harm”.  “Justification” is frequently 
decided on at a political level.   In the Fundamental Safety Principles [IAE06] it is stated 
that “in many cases, decisions relating to benefit and risk are taken at the highest levels 
of government, such as a decision by a State to embark on a nuclear power programme. 
In other cases, the regulatory body may determine whether proposed facilities and 
activities are justified”. 
Optimization  
ICRP 103 [ICR07] defines the “principle of optimization of protection” as ”the 
likelihood of incurring exposures, the number of people exposed, and the magnitude of 
their individual doses should be kept as low as reasonably achievable, taking into 
account economic and societal factors”.  It states that “the level of protection should be 
the best under the prevailing circumstances, maximizing the margin of benefit over 
harm”.  This normally includes careful planning of activities related to construction, 
operation and maintenance that must be undergone in the phases of design, operation 
and decommissioning of a nuclear facility.  It also sometimes includes an iterative 
process where the benefits from further reducing the exposure is each time carefully 
weighed against the extra costs it introduces.  Further reduction of exposure could be 
done by e.g. introducing a further design feature or by altering an operational procedure.   
Dose Limitation  
The principle of application of dose limits is defined as “the total dose to any individual 
from regulated sources in planned exposure situations, other than medical exposure of 
patients, should not exceed the appropriate limits recommended by the ICRP”.   Dose 
limits are defined by the regulatory body of a country and are normally in line with 
recommendations of the ICRP.  Dose limits and risk limits are defined for workers and 
members of the public.  Dose limits normally apply to planned normal exposure 
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situations.  Risk limits apply to accident conditions of a nuclear facility.   Safety 
analysis is primary concerned with demonstrating that dose and risk limits will not be 
exceeded.   
 
1.2.3 How Safety Analysis uses the three fundamental principles, in particular 
for research reactors  
In the following Sections, the three fundamental principles of the “System of 
radiological protection” are again discussed, but in the context of research reactors.  
Any existing or new action, called a “Practice” in ICRP60 [ICR90] terms, must be 
authorized by the regulatory body of a country. 
The action, in this context to be authorized by the nuclear regulator, will be to keep an 
existing research reactor running or to allow the construction of a new research reactor.  
The authorization of an action needs some basis and justification, optimization and dose 
limitation are used in the process to provide such a basis. 
Justification (Research Reactor)  
In the introductory paragraph of Section 1.2 it was stated that it is worth considering 
research reactors to continue operating or even allowing new research reactors to be 
built as some of them are highly valued installations that hold advantage to society.   
This already provides a good argument to say that the net benefit will be large on the 
one side of the scale for “Justification” according to radiation protection principles.   As 
already explained above, the net benefit of a planned or existing exposure situation must 
outweigh the risks it imposes.  Thus, on the other side of the scale, it must now be 
proven that the potential detriment to society is not larger than the benefit.   
This could not be proven for many research reactors and, therefore, many of them have 
been shut down since the 1970s, as mentioned in Section 1.1.2.  These reactors were 
originally built for specific research and training activities and because ongoing 
sustainable development of commercial applications of the reactors could not be carried 
out the benefit from keeping them operational decreased.  On the other side, because of 
ageing considerations, the risk increased.  One reactor that was shut down had a leaking 
pool which rendered the installation to become a liability rather than an asset. 
 15
However, focussing on reactors that have been modified or built to also house 
commercial applications a careful method must be used to quantify the risk.  The 
method used, which is well known in the nuclear industry, is Safety Analysis. 
Safety Analysis is used to quantify the detriment, i.e. the risk.  If the net benefit clearly 
outweighs the risk, e.g. radioisotopes are produced to be used for medical diagnosis and 
treatment of patients, the practice of keeping a research reactor running can be justified.  
Thus, the first of the three radiation protection principles, Justification, is satisfied. 
Optimization (Research Reactor)  
In the Safety Analysis process the second principle, Optimization, is also catered for.  
Installations are evaluated during design and operation to assure that doses are kept As 
Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). 
Dose Limitation (Research Reactor)  
Finally, the Safety Analysis must ensure that during normal operating conditions the 
effective dose to the worker and to the public is kept below the dose limit of 20 mSv 
and 1 mSv, respectively.  Also, during anticipated accident conditions the potential 
doses must be kept below acceptable limits.  If the probability of a certain accident type 
is expected to be very low, e.g. an accident caused by a large earthquake, the risk is 
expressed in terms of risk criteria and not in terms of radiation dose. 
The nuclear industry is very strictly regulated in respect of nuclear safety.  To authorize 
a Practice both the dose limitation and risk criteria, collectively called Regulatory 
Criteria, must be satisfied.  Nuclear safety analyses are performed for new installations 
and periodically on existing facilities. 
Other aspects of safety analysis  
Safety Analysis is not only performed to demonstrate conformance to regulatory 
criteria, but also lately to enable risk-informed decision making. 
To put Safety Analysis of research reactors into context in comparison with other 
nuclear installations, the following brief explanation is also given.  As a result of a long 
operating history (in reactor-years) of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), and the use of 
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similar designs world-wide, a very consistent approach to Safety Analysis of these has 
been developed.  This was formalized in the early 1970s and is captured in reports like 
WASH 1400 [WAS75].  However, for research reactors, because of the very wide range 
of designs and different powers generally ranging from kWs to tens of MWs, it has been 
more difficult to develop standardized approaches.  For the sake of completeness it is 
stated here that various Safety Analysis and assessment techniques for other (non-
reactor) nuclear installations exist, but that is beyond the scope of this study.  Whereas 
the scope of the present study will not focus on NPPs, some of the concepts used are 
taken from NPP Safety Analysis methodology.  It must also be said that modern Safety 
Analysis approaches for research reactors are largely derived from NPP techniques (but 
tailored for research reactors). 
The further development of Safety Analysis techniques for research reactors is 
supported by past incidents that occurred in these installations.  For example, at least 
three accidents involving fatalities have occurred at research reactors facilities.  It is, 
therefore, worth expending effort in developing additional tools for the Safety Analysis 
of research reactors. 
 
1.3 Rationale of Safety Analysis using modern computational 
techniques  
Modern computational techniques are used in support of safety analysis.  Advanced 
safety analysis and design optimizations that were not possible a few years ago can now 
be performed [TEW08].  This has resulted in a gradual switch to a new generation of 
computational tools in order to simulate more realistically complex phenomena 
resulting from accident progression.  Generally, the challenge today is to revisit safety 
design features of the existing research reactors in order to verify that the regulatory 
criteria are still met. 
Also, from time to time, regulatory criteria changes.  This causes the need to revisit the 
existing safety analysis that was done for a research reactor.  The improvement of the 
safety analysis, usually also using the newest tools, sometimes requires plant 
modification.  A second factor that introduces the need for plant modification is when 
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new equipment has to be introduced from recent advancement of new technologies, both 
for better utilisation and better performance of the research reactor.  To better 
understand the contribution of modern computational techniques to the development of 
safety analysis for research reactors, some light is shed on the maturity of this process 
for NPPs.   
Initially, computational techniques provided conservative answers.  In contrast to 
conservative methods, best estimate methods supported by uncertainty analysis 
techniques are now well developed for NPPs through international expertise.  To 
support these standardized techniques, a comprehensive experimental database exists 
for the safety technology of NPPs.  The importance of transferring NPP safety 
technology tools and methods to research reactor safety technology has been noted in 
recent international activities led by the IAEA, e.g. IAEA Safety Report 53 [IAE08a] 
and IAEA Safety Report 55 [IAE08b]. However, the ranges of parameters of interest to 
research reactors are different from those for NPPs. This is in particular applicable for 
fuel composition, system pressure, materials used and overall system geometric 
configuration.  
In order to perform proper safety analysis, so-called initiating events have to be defined.  
Initiating events are events that can trigger an accident.  Once an initiating event has 
occurred, it does not automatically follow that an accident will occur and the probability 
of an accident occurring depends on the effectiveness of the plant’s systems of 
protection.  The standardized designs and known operating history NPPs enabled the 
generation of standard lists of initiating events that could have been agreed upon and 
published.  In contrast, for research reactors, the large variety of type, designs and 
operating modes prevented so far the achievement of systematic and detailed lists of 
initiating events based upon qualified studies. However, bounding and generalized lists 
of initiating events are available from IAEA documents and can be considered for 
further studies in this area. 
Current efforts are well in progress to apply modern techniques to research reactors as 
well, but especially in the field of neutronic and thermal-hydraulic calculations 
[TEW08].  A substantial part of safety analysis is improved by improving these 
methods.  However, these calculations lie in the field of “plant response” to an accident.  
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For NPPs, the plant’s response to an initiating event that could lead to an accident is 
called Level 1 safety analysis or Level 1 Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA).   
Another field of study that thus needs improvement for research reactors is the 
progression of accidents where the radioactive inventory of the reactor core is released 
from the core through the building, filters, stack and eventually leaves the reactor 
building.  The radioactive inventory results from the radioisotopes produced in the 
nuclear reactor core.  This field is also well advanced for NPPs and is called Level 2 
PSA for analysis within the building and Level 3 PSA when the radioactive isotopes 
leave the building and disperse into the atmosphere.  The former is also called “building 
response”. 
The challenge is thus to enhance techniques in the Level 2 and 3 space.  As will be seen 
in Section 2.5.2 “Availability of release fractions for research reactors and the selection 
thereof”, for research reactors, data are relatively scarce that quantifies the amount of 
radioactive inventory released from the core, the distribution thereof within the building 
and the eventual release to the atmosphere.  The hazard posed by a NPP to the public 
and environment is far greater than that of a research reactor because of the much larger 
radioactive inventory, higher temperatures and higher water pressures.  Therefore, Level 
3 analysis is much more important for a NPP.  For research reactors, it is rather 
important to analyse in the Level 2 space.  This is motivated by the larger risk to 
personnel within the facility.   
This study, therefore, aims to contribute to the knowledge of using modern 
computational methods in support of Level 2 Safety Analysis of research reactors.  
Modern computational techniques are available and it has been decided to test the 
application of a well known radiation transport code, the Monte Carlo N-Particle 
(MCNP) code [SHU07].  Although this code is well known and used in many fields, it 
is little explored in the particular application mentioned.   
With this study it is thus hoped not to revise the complete safety analysis process but to 
contribute to the family of techniques used to enhance the ways in which safety analyses 
are done, to make it more effective and to improve the results. 
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1.4 Hypothesis and methodology  
Fundamental hypothesis:  The MCNP code can be used to provide good answers in the 
application of accident studies for research reactors, in particular where workers will be 
potentially exposed to external radiation because of the postulated accident.  Note that 
“accident studies” is part of the process of safety analysis.  However, for the present 
study, the terms “accident studies” and “safety analysis” are used interchangeably.  
In order to provide a demonstration of how the MCNP can be used for accident studies 
of an MTR reactor and how it fit into the process of safety analysis, a representative 
MRT reactor is described with an example of how the MCNP code is applied.  An 
MCNP model was developed based on a real example MTR reactor, that includes the 
dimensions of the reactor hall, the radioactive inventory etc.  The fraction of the 
radioactive inventory released, and the dimensions and materials of construction present 
in the reactor hall also provided input into the MCNP model.  Although other 
radioisotopes will also be released from the reactor core during accident conditions, the 
effect of iodine, in particular the 131I isotope, was studied.    
Some assumptions were made during the development of this model.  Although external 
dose rates resulting from 131I were calculated with the model, calculated external doses 
are also presented assuming that a worker, e.g. an emergency worker performing life 
saving actions or protecting actions, spends 10 minutes in the reactor hall. Therefore, 
the effects of radioactive decay and the effect of iodine plate-out against the walls, floor 
and roof could be ignored.  Subsequently, it was also assumed that the ventilation 
system was removing fission gases at a very slow rate from the reactor hall.  Thus, the 
analysis was regarded as taking a “static” sample in a short period of time.  One of the 
underlying assumptions in such a consideration is that the emergency ventilation, which 
prevents gaseous radioisotopes to leave the building during an accident, had come into 
operation as one of the protecting actions designed into the reactor system for accident 
constitutions. 
It is shown how the radioactive inventory of the fuel, the operational history resulting in 
a certain amount of burn-up, the type of accident, the protecting measures, the 
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characteristics of the reactor building etc. play a role in the radioactive isotopes released 
in a reactor building during an accident.   
However, before the results of the calculations done by this model are presented, the 
dose received by a worker standing in the centre of a hemispherical cloud of 131I were 
calculated with a simple MCNP model and compared with a benchmark analytical 
method, solved numerically.  The result of this comparison provides further confidence 
in the complete MCNP model. 
 
1.5 Research Report structure and chapter outline  
According to the methodology described above, the layout of the study is 
diagrammatically presented in Fig. 1.4. 
 
Figure 1.4: Diagrammatic presentation of Chapter 2 and 3 layouts of the present 
Research Report. 
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The chapter layout structure of the remaining part of the present study is as follows: 
Chapter Two – Theory part consisting of: 
• More theory on safety analysis is described.  The risk of an accident to the 
worker is weighed against that to a member of the public.  This is done for 
research reactors and NPPs to strengthen the emphasis of analysis in the Level 2 
space, where the worker is involved. 
• Radioactive inventory – the mechanisms are described of arriving at a set of 
radioisotopes available in the core at the time of an accident. 
• Release fraction – the release fraction determines what percentage of 
radioisotopes will be released to the building for Level 2 analysis.  The choice of 
131I to study as a representative gas being released during accident conditions is 
justified and it is explained how and on what basis a release fraction for 131I was 
chosen.   
Chapter Three – Results consisting of: 
• A hemispherical shaped cloud of 131I release is used to compare the analytical 
method with the MCNP method. 
• A simple MCNP example applicable to the complete MCNP model is discussed. 
• More detail is presented on the MCNP model constructed specifically for the 
reactor building.   
• A presentation of results is provided.  The results consist of the external 
whole-body dose due to γ-radiation from the 131I cloud and the external skin 
dose due to β– (electron) radiation of the 131I cloud. 
Chapter Four – Conclusions and recommendations are presented.  
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CHAPTER 2 – THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO SAFETY ANALYSIS  
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT 
TO SAFETY ANALYSIS 
In this chapter more theory on safety analysis is described.  This includes detail on the 
levels of safety analysis, the type of accident chosen and the assumptions made with 
respect the amount of fuel damaged.  The probabilities and consequences of accidents 
affecting the worker and the public are also discussed. 
Thereafter, to better understand the assumptions made for the safety analysis and the 
results of the MCNP code runs, some physics of basic interactions of photons is 
discussed.  The formation of radioactive inventory as an input parameter to the safety 
analysis is also discussed and some physics of interaction of the neutrons with matter, in 
particular fission, is discussed.  
Some details are provided on the radiotoxicity and other attributes of iodine.  The 
release fraction and the derivation of source term is also discussed here and it is 
explained that only 131I is further studied, although a complete accident study would 
involve the study of other radioisotopes as well, in particular these that are more 
volatile. 
Before an introduction of the MCNP code is provided, the analytical method to 
determine the dose to a person in the centre of a hemispherical cloud of 131I is discussed.  
The MCNP code is then introduced before further progressing to Chapter 3.  
 
2.1 Safety analysis  
2.1.1 More detail on the levels of safety analysis  
Safety Analysis of a reactor is concerned with three levels, irrespective of whether a 
deterministic or probabilistic safety analysis is done. 
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The first level of safety analysis concerns analysing the plant response to an initiating 
event that could develop into an accident sequence.  For Probabilistic Safety Analysis 
(PSA), this level of analysis corresponds to PSA Level 1.  The types of accident 
initiators (called initiating events) that can lead to plant damage in the context of 
research reactors are briefly discussed in this study as a precursor to the next level of 
safety analysis. 
The second level of safety analysis addresses the building response to an accident that 
has progressed far enough that reactor core damage has occurred and that a subsequent 
release of radioactive material can be expected from the core into the reactor building.  
This corresponds, for probabilistic analysis, to PSA Level 2.  The present study 
describes the accident progression on this level for the specific application in brief terms 
and then focuses on one specific element, namely the radiation from a radioactive 
“cloud” that has formed due to release as a gas of the more volatile radioactive isotopes, 
and in particular the isotope 131I of iodine.   
The third level of safety analysis is concerned with the spreading of radioactive gases 
once the accident has progressed in such a way that it has gone beyond the “barrier” 
provided by the reactor building.  Atmospheric release models are used to determine 
doses to the public.  The description of this level of analysis is beyond the scope of this 
study.   
 
2.1.2 Type of accident chosen for the present study  
The type of accident plays a major role in determining the quantity of fission products 
released and the timescale for the release.  A certain amount of fission products is 
released into the reactor hall, and, depending on the efficiency of the outlet ventilation 
filters and the characteristics of the building, a percentage of this is eventually released 
out of the ventilation stack into the environment.  Based on various selection criteria, 
the scope being beyond the present study, the type of accident chosen for the present 
study is a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).    
Before elaborating on a LOCA, a simplified diagram (see Fig. 2.1) will be discussed 
that shows how the primary coolant inlet and outlet piping  is  connected  to  the  reactor 
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Figure 2.1: Connection of primary water loop to reactor vessel. 
 
vessel.  During normal operation of the research reactor, the residual heat is adequately 
removed by pumping the primary water through the core.  The primary water loop is 
cooled, through a heat exchanger, by a secondary water loop [CAR65].  Under normal 
conditions, the contamination of water with radioisotopes is confined to the primary 
water loop, but the secondary loop is monitored for radioactivity to detect any leak from 
the primary loop.  The secondary loop is cooled by a tertiary water loop, which is in 
turn cooled by the use of cooling towers.  Specially engineered safety systems are 
normally incorporated into the design to prevent or mitigate a severe postulated 
accident.  An example of this is an emergency core cooling water system that provides 
cooling to the core in the case of a LOCA. 
A LOCA is an accident of concern in a research reactor [TEW05].  This type of accident 
can be caused by the rupture of a pipe in the primary cooling system or a break of an 
experimental beam tube [IAE92].  Figure 2.2 shows how a break in the inlet pipe to the 
reactor vessel can cause the core to be partially or completely uncovered and exposed to 
air, thus decreasing the heat removal capacity.  
2.1.3 Amount of fuel damaged  
In any reactor accident, an important measure is to know whether any fuel damage will 
occur during the accident.  As soon as fuel damage has occurred, fission  products  from 
Pool Water
Primay Water 
Loop
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Figure 2.2: Most severe type of LOCA: a large pipe breaks downstream of the 
primary water pump.   
 
the radioactive inventory can be released.  The amount of fission products released will 
depend on various parameters like the temperature of the fuel plate, thickness and 
material of cladding and the composition of fission products that have been formed 
during burn-up.   It is of great importance that fuel damage is avoided at all times.  
Under particularly severe core damage accidents, the total core melts down and forms a 
molten metal mass that flows to the bottom of the reactor vessel.  This particular case is 
more applicable to Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and will not be considered for the 
purpose of the present study.   
 
2.1.4 The decreasing probability of severe fuel damage because of a LOCA  
Normally, on a new fuel type, experiments are performed to test behaviour with respect 
to fuel damage and release of fission products under simulated accident conditions in 
e.g. a laboratory setup.  In this way the behaviour of the new fuel type is qualified.  
Because these experiments on accident conditions in the fuel cannot be representatively 
performed with a great degree of accuracy for the fuel design and core configuration of 
a particular research reactor, theoretical calculations with thermal-hydraulic and 
neutronic codes must be done to verify the use of the specific fuel type.  An example of 
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a thermal-hydraulic code is RELAP5/Mod 3.2 [TEW05], which is used to simulate a 
LOCA or other accident scenarios.   
According to Sharp and McCracken [SHA03], a hypothetical severe fuel damage event 
is seen as a Beyond Design Basis Accident (BDBA), i.e. severe fuel damage, where a 
total core melt-down is regarded as only happening with an annual frequency lower than 
1 x 10-6 per reactor-year.  In other words, this type of accident is also a “non-credible” 
accident. 
 
2.1.5 Basis for choice of damage to fuel due to representative accident 
In light of the above, a total core meltdown is not considered as the “representative” 
accident for this study.  Whereas total core meltdown is often modelled1 for NPPs, 
because of the greater probability thereof, this is not the case for the representative MTR 
reactor.  However, it is assumed that a substantial amount of fuel damage occur 
affecting all 26 fuel elements.  The fuel damage considered includes the formation of 
blisters or partial melting of the fuel cladding that allows the more volatile fission 
products to escape.  Subsequently, the more volatile fission products i.e. the more 
volatile gases are released into the reactor confinement building. 
 
2.2 Risk of accidents to the worker and to the public – a comparison 
with NPPs  
NPPs have a single function, namely to produce electricity.  In general, the tasks 
performed by the personnel in the plant are of a routine nature.  In contrast, at research 
reactors a more frequent alteration in tasks take place.  Some operating parameters may 
change. Research reactors also generally have more operating modes than NPPs.  This 
results in the probability and variety of accidents to the worker being greater for 
research reactors.    On the other hand, NPPs pose a greater risk to the public. 
   
1
 This includes the effects of damage to the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) in a NPP because of the 
molten metal core, the subsequent flow of molten metal to the bottom of the reactor containment building   
and the built-up of pressure in the containment building due to hydrogen that is formed and fission 
products that are released. 
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2.2.1 Risk of accidents at research reactors  
The risk of accidents is more to the worker in research reactors  
The argument was put to the Research Reactor Review [RRR93] that worker accidents 
are more common in multipurpose research reactors than in NPPs because there are 
more frequent start-ups, shut-downs, fuel and rig movements, and more opportunities 
for human error. 
The Research Reactor Review [RRR93] referred to a 1980 report by the US Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory (ORNL) which listed 9 serious accidents involving prototype 
power reactors or experimental reactors, and a further 3 involving multipurpose research 
reactors [BER80]. 
 
The risk of accidents is less to the Public for research reactors  
The Research Reactor Review [RRR93] claims that: "Excluding experimental and 
prototype reactors, only four accidents designated as serious have occurred in multi-
purpose research reactors. No off-site consequences were identified in any of the four 
cases.".  Thus, as stated these serious accidents did not even lead to off-site effects.  Off-
site effects are defined as projected or actual exposure to off-site members of the public 
due to the large release of radioactive material. 
The available radioactive inventory is also much smaller, i.e. approximately two to three 
orders of magnitude lower, for research reactors than for NPPs.  Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the potential risk to the public from research reactors is less than from 
NPPs.  
 
2.2.2 Risk of accidents at NPPs  
The risk of accidents is less to the worker in NPPs  
At NPPs, on the other hand, because of less frequent start-ups, shut-downs, fuel 
movements and experimental and other activities around the reactor while running, 
worker accidents are less common.  There are also fewer opportunities for human error 
that will cause exposure to the worker. 
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The risk of accidents is more to the public in NPPs  
As argued in Section 2.2.1 there is no dispute that, in general, accidents involving NPPs 
pose a far greater risk to the general public because of the far greater volumes of fissile 
material used as fuel in NPPs, which entails higher inventories of fission products. 
 
2.3 Physics of basic interactions of ionizing photons with matter 
In this section, an overview of basic interactions of ionizing photons with matter is 
provided with the aim in mind to obtain more insight into the calculations done to 
determine dose to a worker from a radioactive cloud of 131I.   This is valid for the 
traditional method used to calculate the dose from a large amount of discrete volumes to 
a receptor as explained in Section 2.6 and to get insight into the photon interactions of 
absorption and scattering that is accounted for in the built-in physics and operation of 
the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) code used. 
To better understand the concepts of interaction of radiation with matter, some basic 
atomic physics will first be introduced in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.  Section 2.3.1 also 
provides some input into understanding Section 2.4 but the material is included here for 
the completeness of this section.  Thereafter, the principles of absorption and scattering 
of photons will be discussed in Section 2.3.3. 
 
2.3.1 Overview of some concepts in atomic physics 
An atom consists of a nucleus and a “cloud” of negatively charged electrons moving in 
different orbits at different energy levels.  The atomic nucleus further consists of 
protons and neutrons, the former being positively charged.    Other particles also exist in 
an atom, but the major particles of concern to understand the physics below are the ones 
mentioned.   Protons and neutrons are also collectively called nucleons. 
Ninety-two naturally occurring elements exists in nature with uranium having the 
highest atomic number (92).   Several heavier elements have been made up artificially 
e.g. plutonium with an atomic number of 94.  Of the same element, stable isotopes and 
unstable radioactive isotopes exist.   
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Instability and radioactivity 
Of the elements with small atomic numbers, large percentages of the naturally occurring 
isotopes are stable.  However, small amounts of radioactive naturally occurring isotopes 
of these elements exist in nature, e.g. 3H (Tritium) and 14C.    
All isotopes of elements with an atomic number larger than 83 are radioactive.  To 
better understand this phenomena a short explanation of the influence of the size of the 
nucleus and the forces therein are explained.  
Two main types of forces play a role between the nucleons in a nucleus, the attractive 
strong nuclear force and the Coulomb repulsive force which acts between the positively 
charged protons.  When the atomic number is low, the repulsive force among the 
protons is small and a neutron to proton ratio of close to unity is appropriate for 
stability.   With increasing atomic number the repulsive force increases proportional to 
the square of the atomic number (i.e. to Z2).  To compensate for the increasing repulsive 
force the ratio of neutrons to protons is larger in a stable isotope in order to maintain 
stability.  However, a limit exists where the excess amount of neutrons over protons 
cannot compensate to maintain stability.    
Unstable isotopes undergo radioactive decay, which is spontaneous change at a definite 
rate, and emit α or β-particles.  The α-particles emitted are the same as helium nuclei 
and consists of two protons and two neutrons.  The β-particles are electrons that are not 
originating from the electron cloud but rather from the unstable nucleus, where a 
neutron is converted to a proton with the emission of a β–-particle or vice versa with the 
emission of a positron (β+-particle), which is a positive electron.   
Beta decay can be better explained by means of the following formulae: 
60Co  60Ni + β– + , (2.1) 
where 60Co is the parent nucleus, 60Ni is the daughter nucleus, β– the β–-particle and  
the neutral anti-neutrino.  Similarly, the decay of 22Na can be shown below, yielding a 
β
+
-particle and neutrino instead of a β–-particle and anti-neutrino, respectively.   
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22Na  22Ne + β+ + . (2.2) 
 
Because either a neutrino or an antineutrino, which shares the reaction energy of the 
decay, is emitted as well, there is an energy spectrum, ranging from 0 to the maximal 
available energy.  The shape of the energy curve of the β-particles depends upon what 
fraction of the balance of the reaction energy or missing energy is carried by the 
neutrino or an antineutrino.  The average energy of the β-particles emitted is 
approximately equal to a third of the maximum energy.   
The energy curve of β+-particles also differs from these of β–-particles.  This can be 
explained by the fact that the negatively charged β–-particle is attracted to the positively 
charged nucleus, whereas the positively charged β+-particles are repelled from the 
positively charged nucleus.  Shown in Fig. 2.3 are the continuous  energy  spectra  for   
β
–
-particles and β+-particles, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Continuous energy spectra for β–-particles and β+-particles of 64Cu 
[KRA88]. 
 
As will be elaborated on in Section 2.3.3 under “the emission of photons”, both α and β 
radioactive decay is usually accompanied by the emission of γ-ray photons.  The decay 
schemes for 60Co and 22Na are shown in Figs. 2.4 and 2.5, indicating the β-decay and 
corresponding γ-ray photons.  Although the interactions of γ-ray photons with matter are 
only explained in Section 2.3.3, the gamma spectra of 60Co and 22Na, which provide 
better insight into the decay schemes and γ-ray photons emitted, are also shown in Figs 
2.6 and 2.7, respectively.  The Compton Scattering region and the photo peaks arising 
 Figure 2.4: 60Co decay scheme
 
Figure 2.6: Gamma spectrum
 
Figure 2.7: Gamma spectrum 
Compton 
Scattering region 
(in detector)
 31
 
 [ICR83]. Figure 2.5: 22Na decay scheme
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 [ICR83]. 
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from de-exitation of the parent nuclides can be seen in Figs. 2.6 and 2.7.  
Bremsstrahlung, originating from the Photo-electric Effect (also explained in Section 
2.3.3), occur as a result of interactions of the electrons emitted in the detector by the γ-
ray photon interactions.  However, since the energy spectrum of the Bremsstrahlung is 
continuous and the energy of Bremsstrahlung photons may take any value between 
“zero” and the maximum kinetic energy of incident electrons, a distinct peak of 
Bremsstrahlung emitted, cannot be seen in Figs 2.6 and 2.7. 
β
–
-particles are primarily the concern of the present study.  This can be justified by the 
fact that reactions taking place in a nuclear reactor results in a neutron rich environment 
and generally produces radioisotopes that are rich in neutrons.  Hence these isotopes, 
when decaying with β-decay, emit β–-particles.  These β–-particles are referred to in the 
results chapter (Chapter 3) as electrons when considering radiation transport 
calculations with MCNP. 
Radioactive decay series 
To better understand how various radioactive isotopes can result in other radioactive 
isotopes eventually forming a series, brief mention is made of the four distinct 
radioactive decay series.   Although as previously stated, uranium is the heaviest 
element found in nature, the heaviest stable elements found in nature are several 
isotopes of lead (atomic number 82) and one of bismuth (atomic number 83).  These 
isotopes of lead are 204Pb, 206Pb, 207Pb, and 208Pb found at 1.4%, 24.1%, 22.1%, and 
52.1%, respectively, and the isotope of bismuth, 209Bi.  Except for the first natural 
isotope of lead (204Pb), all of these isotopes are at least partially of radiogenic origin.  As 
seen in Table 2.1, three radioactive series end in 206Pb, 207Pb, and 208Pb and the fourth 
one in 209Bi.  In Table 2.1, the four series are shown by indicating the series' name, its 
first isotope, the first isotope’s half-life and its last isotope. 
Three of these radioactive decay series are named after the isotope with the longest 
half-life. The actinium series is named after one its members, in order to avoid having 
two series with identical names. Only the first three series in Table 2.1 are presently 
found in nature since the Neptunium series half-life is much shorter than the age of the 
earth [GRE02].   An example is provided in Table 2.2 of the full radioactive decay chain 
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Table 2.1: Four naturally occurring radioactive decay series.  The half-life is that of 
the longest living member. 
Series Name First isotope 
Half-life 
[years] 
Last 
isotope 
Uranium 238U 4.49 x 109 206Pb 
Actinium 235U 7.10 x 108 207Pb 
Thorium 232Th 1.39 x 1010 208Pb 
Neptunium 237Np 2.14 x 106 209Bi 
 
Table 2.2: The Actinium decay series. 
Isotope Half-life Decay Mode Branching Ratio 
Decay 
Product 
235U 7.04 x 108 y α 100% 231Th 
231Th 25.52 h β− 100% 231Pa 
231Pa 3. 28 x 104 y α 100% 227Ac 
227Ac 21.78 y 
β
−
 98.62% 227Th 
α   1.38% 223Fr 
227Th 18.68 d α 100% 223Ra 
223Fr 22.00 m 
β
−
 99.994% 223Ra 
α   0.006% 219At 
223Ra 11.43 d α 100% 219Rn 
219At 56 s 
α 97.00% 215Bi 
β
−
 3.00% 219Rn 
219Rn 3.96 s α 100% 215Po 
215Bi 7.60 m β− 100% 215At 
215Po 1.78 ms 
α 99.99977% 211Pb 
β
−
   0.00023% 215At 
215At 0.10 ms α 100% 211Bi 
211Pb 36.10 m β− 100% 211Bi 
211Bi 2.14 m 
α 99.724% 207Tl 
β
−
   0.276% 211Po 
211Po 516 ms α 100% 207Pb 
207Tl 4.77 m β− 100% 207Pb 
207Pb stable    
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of the Actinium series.  Radioactive decay plays an active role in the built-up of and 
constant change of composition of radioisotopes in the core of a nuclear reactor.  This 
will be put into context in Section 2.4. 
2.3.2 Exited states of the Atom and Nucleus 
Exited states of the Electrons in an Atom 
Some of the electrons moving in orbits are more tightly bound in an atom than others.  
More energy is needed to remove an electron from the inner most orbit (K shell), than 
what is needed to remove it from an outer orbit.  For example, for lead, 88 keV is 
needed to remove an electron from the K shell and only 7.38 keV is needed to remove 
an electron from the outer orbit [LAM01].    The process of removing electrons from its 
orbits is called ionization.  The energy that is needed to remove an electron from its 
orbit is called the ionization energy or, alternatively, is called the “binding energy” of 
the electron. 
With respect to the energy states of the electrons in an atom, there are various energy 
states in which the electrons can be.  The lowest energy state is called the ground state.  
When the atom is in a higher energy state, it is called to be in the excited state.  The 
different energy states can be depicted on an energy-level diagram.  When an electron(s) 
is (are) completely removed from the atom, the atom is ionized.  Thus, the energy added 
to an atom by means of incoming radiation (i.e. neutrons, photons or charged particles) 
can either cause its electrons to be in particular excited states or ionize the atom.   
When an electron is in one of the excited states it tends to move towards a lower energy 
state and eventually the ground state.  In this process, in turn it emits a photon.  The 
atom thus “decays” to a lower energy state. 
Exited states of the Nucleus 
Similar to the scheme in which the electrons are at different energy levels, the nucleons 
can also be at different energy levels.  The state of lowest energy is also called the 
ground state.  Except for very light nuclei, all other nuclei have excited states, generally 
with many more states than for electrons and also at much higher energies.  The nucleus 
can also decay by emitting a photon.   
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Emission of photons by an excited nucleus 
Although there are many types of photons and at various energies, we are here 
concerned with ionizing photons.  These are photons that have the capability of causing 
radiation damage.  Two types of ionizing photons are of concern; X-ray photons and 
γ-ray photons. 
Because nuclear excited states are at much higher energies than those of electrons in 
atoms, the photons emitted from the nucleus are emitted at much higher energies than 
the photons that are emitted from the electron cloud around the nucleus, e.g. when the 
electrons move to a lower energy state.  Hence, a distinction is made between photons 
originating from the nucleus and photons originating from the electron cloud.  In the 
former case γ-ray photons are produced and in the latter X-ray photons with energies in 
the order of MeVs and keVs, respectively. 
γ-ray photons are produced usually alongside other forms of radiation such as α or β-
decay.  When a nucleus emits an α or β-particle, the daughter nucleus is sometimes left 
in an excited state.  It can then jump down to a lower level by emitting a γ-ray photon. 
 
2.3.3 Basic interactions of ionizing photons with matter 
As stated in the introduction to Section 2.3, the basic interactions of ionizing photons 
are discussed with the explanation of the MCNP code in mind.  The application of the 
MCNP code for the present study is treated in Section 2.7.    Since we are primarily 
concerned with γ-ray photons for the present study, when referring to “ionizing 
photons” or just “photons”, it is implied that it is γ-ray photons, unless otherwise stated. 
Of particular interest are the ways in which ionizing photons can deposit energy into 
matter, especially the human body.  The amount of energy deposited is called the 
absorbed dose and is the measure that will be used for the MCNP results. 
When ionizing photons pass through a medium, the photon can: 
• penetrate through the section of matter without interacting; 
• interact with the matter and be completely absorbed by depositing its energy, 
called the Photo-electric Effect; or 
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• interact and be scattered or deflected from its original direction and deposit part 
of its energy, called the Compton Effect. 
A third interaction, which does not strictly falls into the categories above is Pair 
Production where an electron-positron pair are formed, usually followed by the 
annihilation of the positron with another electron, resulting in another two photons 
(Eγ = 0.511 MeV) being produced. 
Each of the three interactions, the Photo-electric Effect, the Compton Effect and Pair 
Production are discussed in more detail below.  These are considered as the main types 
of interactions ionizing photons can undergo [KRA88].   
Photo-electric Effect 
An ionizing photon interacts with and transfers its energy to an atomic electron, ejecting 
that electron from the atom. The kinetic energy of the resulting electron is equal to the 
energy of the incident γ-ray photon minus the binding energy of the electron [KRA88]. 
The Photo-electric Effect is more dominant at lower energies, generally in the region of 
50 keV and lower.   
As can be seen, the transfer of energy takes place from the incident photon to the 
resulting electron.  The resulting electron, if passing near another nucleus, emits 
Bremsstralung.  Also, a “gap” is left in the original atom’s orbit, caused by the resulting 
electron that had been ejected.  An electron from an higher energy orbit decays to the 
vacancy and emits a characteristic X-ray photon [GLA81].  It can thus be seen that all 
the energy of the incident photon is transferred to the matter through which it passes.  
Figure 2.8 shows a representation of the Photo-electric Effect. 
Compton Effect 
This is an interaction in which an incident ionizing photon loses enough energy to an 
atomic electron to cause its ejection, with the remainder of the original photon's energy 
being emitted as a new, lower energy ionizing photon with an emission direction 
different from that of the incident photon [GLA81].  Compton scattering is thought to 
be the principal  absorption  mechanism for  γ-ray  photons  in  the  wide  energy  range  
from 100 keV to 10 MeV, although it can also occur at lower energies.  The  probability 
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Figure 2.8: Schematic representation of the Photo-electric Effect. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Schematic representation of the Compton Effect. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Schematic representation of Pair Production. 
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of the Compton Effect taking place at a given energy versus the probability other 
interactions, i.e. the Photo-electric Effect and Pair Production, will be discussed under 
the subheading “The Photo-electric Effect versus the Compton Effect” below.  For 
example, it will be made clear that in the region of 50 keV to 100 keV, either the Photo-
electric Effect or the Compton Effect can occur.  Figure 2.9 shows a representation of 
the Compton Effect. 
Pair Production 
Pair Production is a photon-matter interaction that can occur only when photons have 
energy at an excess of 1.022 MeV. 
By interaction with the electric field of a nucleus, the energy of the incident photon is 
converted into the matter.  The interaction produces a pair of particles, an electron and a 
positron.  When the positron meets a free electron, the two particles are converted to 
two 0.511 MeV or higher energy photons.  This process is called annihilation.  
[CEM96].  Pair production is more dominant at higher photon energies, generally in the 
region of above 10 MeV.  It is important to note that the two 0.511 MeV photons 
produced (equivalent to the rest mass of the electron) can interact in their turn  either  by  
Compton  Scatteringor the Photo-electric Effect.  One or both photons can also leave the 
medium.  It can thus be seen that Pair Production is also an energy absorption 
mechanism.   Figure 2.10 shows a representation of Pair Production. 
Photon cross-section data 
The probability that each the above interactions can take place depends on the energy of 
the incident photon and the absorbing medium in which the interaction takes place.  The 
probability of interaction is sometimes called the cross-section (σ) when expressed in 
barns / atom.  Figure 2.11 shows the relative importance of the three main interactions 
as a function of the Z number of the absorbing medium and the energy of the incident 
photon travelling at the speed of light.  The energy of the incident photon, can also be 
expressed as hυ where h is Planck’s constant and υ the frequency of the photon.    
Figure 2.12 shows the probability of  photon  interactions  as  a  function  of  energy  for  
air expressed as mass attenuation coefficients.   Also  shown  are  the  corresponding  
mass absorption coefficients.  The mass attenuation coefficients is representing the case  
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Figure 2.11: The relative importance of the three major types of interactions of 
ionizing photons [KNO99]. 
 
Figure 2.12: Mass absorption and attenuation coefficients as function of energy of 
incident photon [EVA55]. 
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where it is assumed that all photons are absorbed, i.e. that the energy carried away by 
the scattering photon in Compton Effect, and the energy carried away by annihilated 
radiation (photon produced) in Pair Production is not included.  If these effects are 
included, less energy is absorbed in the medium, and this is represented by the mass 
absorption coefficients shown Fig. 2.12.  Figure 2.13 shows an example of mass 
absorption coefficients for different materials and incident photons of different energies. 
The Photo-electric Effect versus the Compton Effect 
From Fig. 2.11 it can be seen that the Photo-electric Effect is dominant at low incident 
photon energies and in absorbing mediums of high Z numbers.  At approximately 
1 MeV, the Compton Effect is the dominant effect for all Z numbers.  From the 
descriptions of the Photo-electric Effect and the Compton Effect, and the energy ranges 
mentioned for these interactions (below 50 keV and above 100 keV, respectively), it 
may seem that there is an apparent gap in which it is not clear what interaction takes 
place.  However, as now can be seen, both of these interactions can occur in this energy 
range, depending on the Z number of the absorbing medium.  Also, considering the 
specific example of air (Fig 2.12), it can be seen that both interactions takes place up to 
100 keV, but below 40 keV, the Photo-electric Effect is dominant.   
Compton Effect versus Pair Production 
From Figs. 2.11 it can be seen that the Compton scattering is the dominant effect in the 
intermediate energy ranges (~ 1 – 5 Mev) and that the photon cross-section for Pair 
Production remains low until the energy of the incident photon approaches several 
MeVs.  In this energy region, in turn, this is the dominant mechanism.   For the example 
of air (Fig. 2.12), Pair Production only becomes dominant above ~ 10 MeV. 
Most probable interaction for 131I 
The majority of the photons emitted by 131I have an energy that exceeds 0.1 MeV.  Also, 
none of the photon energies exceeds 1 MeV.  For example, the photon with the highest 
abundance emits 0.3645 MeV with a branching fraction of 81.2%.  Therefore, according 
to Fig. 2.12, it is expected that the majority of the photons emitted by the 131I gas cloud 
in the reactor hall will undergo the Compton Effect.   
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Figure 2.13: Mass absorption coefficients as function of energy of incident photon for 
different materials [CEM96]. 
 
2.4 Radioactive Inventory in a reactor core 
In this section, the mechanism of formation of a collection of radioisotopes in a reactor 
core during operation is discussed.  This is an important input for accident studies.  
However, before more detail will be given to the assumptions made and method used to 
arrive at the collection of radioisotopes in the reactor core, called Radioactive Inventory, 
some basic physics concepts of neutron interaction with matter will be explained. 
 
2.4.1 Physics of basic interactions of neutrons producing a radioactive inventory 
Various neutron reactions are considered for reactor-core operational performance 
calculations amongst which are elastic scattering, inelastic scattering, fission and 
neutron capture [KES83].  The latter two reactions are of importance to the production 
of a radioactive inventory and are discussed in more detail in sections below under 
subheadings “Fission” and “Neutron capture and radioactive decay”, respectively. 
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Fission  
Nuclear fission is a process by which a nucleus splits into two or more lighter isotopes 
either spontaneously or after the original nucleus has absorbed various particles, in most 
cases an incoming slow neutron, or γ-ray photons.  Fission is the main source of nuclear 
energy in a nuclear reactor. 
The fission process was first discovered by Hahn and Strassman in 1939 [ROY67].  
After the discovery of fission it was quickly perceived by Meitner and Frisch (1939) 
that the phenomenon could be explained as a consequence of the Liquid Drop Model of 
the nucleus [LYN89].   
Liquid Drop Model 
The Liquid Drop Model can be used to envisage how a nucleus breaks apart.  An 
incoming neutron is absorbed by a large nucleus and causes it to become unstable.  
The unstable nucleus can be compared with a liquid drop that is about to split into 
two separate drops.  Some energy is needed to deform the liquid drop enough to 
split.  A heavy nucleus is more easily deformed.  Also, certain factors like the 
strong nuclear force and surface tension of the “liquid drop” play an important role 
in the fission process.  The Liquid Drop Model has five components i.e. Volume, 
Surface, Coulomb, Asymmetry and Pairing Energy terms. 
Fission barrier, “fissile” and “ fissionable”  
When an incident neutron is absorbed by a nucleus, the binding energy of the 
neutron is added to the nucleus.  The minimum excitation energy required for 
nuclear fission to take place is called the fission barrier energy.  If the binding 
energy added by the incident neutron is enough to overcome the fission barrier 
energy, fission takes.  This is only possible in fissile materials, where fission takes 
place due to incident slow or thermal neutrons.  The fissile isotopes are 233U, 235U 
and 239Pu. 
Other materials are fissionable.  In these cases, however, the kinetic energy of the 
incident neutron is also needed to overcome the fission barrier energy.  Therefore, 
in fissionable materials, fission can be caused by fast neutrons.  
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Thermal neutrons 
A thermal neutron is a free neutron with a kinetic energy of approximately 0.025 
eV which is the energy corresponding to the most probable velocity at a 
temperature of 290 K.  After a number of collisions with nuclei (scattering) in a 
neutron moderator medium at this temperature (most effectively protons of a light 
water moderator), neutrons arrive at approximately this energy, provided that they 
are not absorbed. 
Fast neutrons 
A fast neutron is a free neutron with a kinetic energy close to 1 MeV.  Fast 
neutrons are produced by nuclear processes such as nuclear fission.  Fast neutrons 
can be changed into thermal neutrons by means of the moderation process.  In 
reactors, typically heavy water, light water or graphite are used to moderate 
neutrons. 
Fission yield curve and asymmetric fission products 
Many different isotopes may be produced by fission.  This is illustrated by 
Fig 2.14 which shows the distribution by mass number of binary fission fragments 
induced by thermal neutrons and fast neutrons.   
It is seen that symmetrical fission, which is the break-up into two nuclei of equal 
mass, is quite rare, especially for thermal neutrons.  It can also be seen in the 
upper curve that with increasing neutron energy, i.e. in the range of fast neutrons, 
the probability of symmetrical fission increases.  The mass numbers of the 
isotopes produced vary generally between 70 and 170.  Typical examples of 
radioactive fission products are 85Kr, 90Sr, 131I and 137Cs. 
 
Neutron capture and radioactive decay  
As mentioned in the introductory paragraph of this section (Section 2.4.1), 
neutron-nucleus reactions can be classified into three categories, i.e. fission, scattering 
and neutron capture.  Except for most instances of elastic scattering, the first stage in a 
neutron-nucleus reaction is usually the absorption  of  the neutron by the nucleus to 
form a “compound nucleus” in an excited stage [GLA81].  In  the  instance  of  inelastic 
Figure 2.14: Fission yield as a func
 
scattering, another neutron is almost immediately expelled from the compound nucleus.  
However, the compound nucleus can also change in undergo change in other ways, e.g. 
by emitting a γ-ray photon.  This proce
symbol (n,γ).  Another isotope, with one more neutron is thus formed.  Radiative 
capture occurs more readily with slow than fast neutrons.  Followed by the (n,
reaction are often a series of reactions where 
Similarly, other processes e.g. (n, 2n) reactions takes place.  Together with fission, these 
nuclear processes that take place in the uranium  fuel  change  the  concentration  of  the
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various isotopes in the reactor core during operation.  The radioactive inventory, 
therefore, constantly changes. 
Classification of isotopes that makes the radioactive inventory 
The isotopes produced by the mechanisms described in subheadings “Fission” and 
“Neutron capture and radioactive decay” above are classified into three groups, fission 
products, activation products and actinides.  The production of fission products has 
already been described.  Activation products form due to neutron capture of fission 
products and produce radioactive isotopes with similar mass numbers. 
The last group, called “actinides”, are formed through the same mechanisms but from 
high mass number elements i.e. from uranium and higher.  These elements are also 
called the trans-uranic elements. Typical examples of actinides that are formed in a 
reactor are 234U, 235U, 236U and 238U, although the amounts and ratio of all three (except 
236U) are also a function of the enrichment process that was used during the 
manufacturing of the fuel. 
 
2.4.2 Radioactive Inventory at Time of Accident  
As a point of departure for accident analysis, the radioactive inventory in the reactor 
core, at the time when the accident sequence started, must be known.  This is 
determined by means of theoretical calculations, done by a computer code.   For the 
present study, the computer code ORIGIN-S, which is part of the modular code system 
SCALE [SCA05], was used to calculate the radioactive inventory. 
Before more details of the ORIGIN-S calculation are provided in Section 2.4.3, some 
aspects influencing the calculation and of relevance to the output of the calculation will 
be discussed. 
 
Systematic built-up of radioactive inventory during an operational cycle 
As already stated, it is important to know the radioactive inventory in the fuel.  
However, of more importance is to know which part of the radioactive inventory can be 
relatively easily released and under what conditions.  In this regard, the original content 
and irradiation history of the fuel is important. 
 46
Un-irradiated fuel versus irradiated fuel in relation to hazard imposed by 
radioactive inventory 
When the fuel is manufactured, it is clad.  For the MTR type reactor the uranium 
fuel is clad in a sandwich pattern, between aluminium plates, as already explained 
in Section 1.1.3 and depicted in Fig. 1.3.  The uranium in the fuel is enriched, 
which means that the percentage of 235U is more than that of naturally occurring 
uranium, which is approximately 0.72% with 238U making up over 99%.    
When the fuel is loaded in the reactor, it called “fresh fuel”.  It has not yet been 
irradiated, which means that the fissile material, the 235U in this case, has not 
undergone any fission yet.  Fuel is manufactured in such a way that the uranium is 
in a stable matrix form.  The only radioactive isotopes in the fuel at this stage are 
these of uranium itself.  As seen from Table 2.1, the half-lifes of 235U and 238U are 
very long (7.10 x 108 y and 4.49 x 109 y, respectively).  Hence the specific activity 
of the uranium is relatively low.  The uranium is also in a solid form.  The chances 
of releasing this radioactive uranium to outside the cladding, not to even mention 
outside the pool, are very remote.  That is why accident studies are not much 
concerned with the radioactive inventory of the fuel at this stage. 
However, the moment when the fission reaction commences, a build-up of a wide 
spectrum of other radioactive isotopes starts.  Some of these isotopes are volatile 
or semi-volatile and can thus more easily escape from the cladding when it is 
damaged due to accident conditions, e.g. because of excessive heat in the fuel.   
Burn-up  
Burn-up, which is the decrease of fissile 235U present in the fuel, is taken as a 
measure of how much nuclear fuel has been used and is a function of the amount 
of fission that has taken place.  Burn-up can thus be seen as a decrease of fissile 
235U present in the fuel.  Burn-up can also be defined as a function of the total 
number of fissions that has taken place i.e. the fissions due to 235U being present as 
well as due to the fissions of 239Pu.  Some 239Pu forms in the fuel during operation 
and can contribute to the fission process.  The burn-up percentage is calculated as 
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the amount of 235U that has undergone fission over the total amount of 235U that 
was present before start-up. 
As will be explained below, for the purpose of the study, all the fuel elements are 
assumed to be at a burn-up of 80%.  The most hazardous fission products are 
generally found at the maximum burn-up i.e. when most of the 235U has been used, 
which is at the so called End of Life (EOL) of a fuel element.  In the case of a 
research reactor, at this percentage of burn-up, it is difficult to operate the reactor, 
i.e. to obtain criticality or to keep it critical at the desired power level because of 
the lack of sufficient fissile material. 
In practice, for research reactors, all the fuel elements will not be simultaneously 
at EOL, as this would make operation of a nuclear reactor rather difficult.  
Therefore, an operational core will consist of some “fresh” fuel elements which 
are at Beginning of Life (BOL), some semi-burned-up or semi-depleted fuel 
elements and some fuel elements near EOL.   
The choice of 80% burn-up for all the fuel elements is a conservative assumption 
and is often made for the purpose of accident analysis.  This imply that each of the 
fuel elements contain the maximum amount of fission products.  Such 
conservative assumptions can be refined to give a more realistic (called “best 
estimate”) picture of the combination of fresh, semi-burned and fully burned fuel 
elements but this is not the purpose of the present study. 
The history of a fuel element, which can be directly related to burn-up, is 
expressed in Megawatt Days (MWDs).   For example, if it is known that a core 
has been running at 20 MW for 20 days, the reactor core and fuel elements have 
been running for 20 x 20 = 400 MWDs.  To ensure that the actual burn-up 
corresponds to theoretical calculations, measurements are also taken with, for 
example, copper flux wires. 
A typical cycle is about 4 weeks long which ends in a burn-up of 20 MW / 26 Fuel 
Elements and with 28 days gives 560 / 26 ≈ 22 MWDs per cycle for one fuel 
element assembly.  A fuel element is used for approximately 6 cycles, which 
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results in a burn-up of approximately 132 MWDs per fuel element.  This is far less 
than the calculation that is done for 180 MWDs or 80% burn-up.  The present 
investigation is, therefore, conservative because it is an accident study.  
 
2.4.3 Calculation of radioactive inventory in a fuel element   
The ORIGIN-S code [SCA05] is able to calculate the spectrum, quantity and activity of 
isotopes in a fuel element at any given time, knowing the amount of burn-up of a fuel 
element.  This code incorporates the effects of the mechanisms discussed in Section 
2.4.1.   
For the purpose of this study, a calculation with the ORIGIN-S code was done with 26 
fuel elements, and, as explained in Section 2.4.2, a burn-up of 80% in each fuel element.  
An output file was generated which contained over 40 fission products, activation 
products and actinide elements and over 180 isotopes of these elements.  The masses, 
and more important for the study, the activities (in Bq) of each of these isotopes are also 
generated.  The list of isotopes and there corresponding activities are depicted in Table 
C.1 of Appendix C.  
Theoretically, each of these isotopes can be now be analysed by hand, in view of the 
photons and particles it gives off, and the energy of each of these, and a long list of 
photons and particles and corresponding energies and branching fractions could be 
generated, using a source like ICRP 38 [ICR83].  In our case, only the 131I isotope’s 
energies and branching fractions were analysed and the data used for the MCNP model. 
 
2.4.4 Protection measures during time of accident  
The type of protection and mitigating measures also play a major role in the amount 
fission products released and the time scale in which they are released.  The accident 
sequence and the outcome in terms of severity of the radiological consequence is to a 
great extent determined by the protection and mitigating measures in place and the 
effectiveness thereof.  Protection and mitigating measures consist of hardware systems 
and human actions like work procedures for operating the reactor and for emergency 
situations.  The main systems that play a role during an accident sequence are the 
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reactor protection system that contains the control-rod scram system and the emergency 
ventilation system that forms part of the radioactive confinement system.  The former 
system is a protection system that prevents an accident and the latter system is a 
mitigating system that limits the radiological effects outside the building.   
In the case of the “representative” accident (see Section 2.1.2), it is assumed that the 
emergency ventilation still works.  This implies that the integrity of the reactor hall is 
still good enough that the emergency ventilation provides a negative pressure and that 
the activated charcoal filters capture the majority of the iodine.  Some events, namely, 
internally originated events like fire or externally originated events like air craft crashes, 
can damage a building in such a way that the emergency ventilation does not function, 
but this is not considered for the representative accident.  
  
2.4.5 Characteristics of the reactor building  
The reactor, as described in Section 1.1.3, is situated in a large hall serviced by an 
emergency ventilation system.  The reactor hall serves as “confinement” structure.  This 
means that the reactor is not designed, as in the case of most NPPs, with a 
“containment” building, that is designed for internal pressure in the building due to the 
release of fission products and other phenomena that cause a pressure built-up in the 
building.  It is assumed that the ventilation can remove the fission products at a 
sufficient rate to prevent an overpressure (see Section 2.4.4).  Since the reactor vessel is 
situated underneath the water, and during an accident the more volatile fission product 
gases will migrate through the water to the surface and will then be released in the 
building, it is expected that a radioactive cloud, consisting of the radioisotopes of the 
noble gases xenon and krypton and some halogens, namely iodine, will form above the 
reactor pool.   During a LOCA, as can be seen from Fig. 2.2, excess amounts of water 
may be released from the pool and primary water system, which may result in steam 
forming above the core due to the excessive heat in the core.  This will enhance the 
release of the volatile noble gases, xenon and krypton, and the halogen iodine.   The 
behaviour of the fission products and complete radioactive inventory is better explained 
in Section 2.5, in particular Section 2.5.3, where release fractions are explained. 
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2.5 Release Fractions used for Source Term  
Another important part of the calculation that needs to be considered for the accident 
study is the determination of release fractions.  For a Level 2 analysis, this is the 
fraction of the fission products that will escape out of the pool into the reactor hall. 
   
2.5.1 Definition of Source Term  
Source Term is generally defined as the amount of radioactivity, given by the different 
radioisotopes and corresponding activities, that is “available” during an exposure 
scenario such as an accident to cause radiological damage to an exposed person, the 
environment or material.  Therefore, the whole Radioactive Inventory can not be 
considered as comprising the Source Term since all of these nuclides will not leave the 
reactor core, vessel and pool to the reactor hall.  For the purpose of this investigation, 
the fraction of fission gases, in particular iodine, that is released to the building are of 
importance.  The term “Release Fraction” is used to define the ratio of activity of a 
particular isotope that leaves the reactor pool to the reactor hall over the amount of 
activity of that particular isotope that was originally in the fuel at the time when the 
release from the fuel started.  The Release Fraction can thus be understood as the 
percentage of a particular isotope that leaves the fuel.   
For Level 3 Analysis, the Source Term is defined as the activity that leaves the reactor 
and that serves as input for atmospheric dispersion modelling.  In this case, release 
fractions are defined as the ratio of a certain radionuclide that leaves the building over 
the original activity in the fuel.  
Since a Level 3 Analysis is outside the scope of the present study, it can thus be seen 
that the Source Term is the activity that is present in the building. The release fraction, 
as will be elaborated on in the next section, is used to derive the Source Term from the 
original radioactive inventory.  
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2.5.2 Availability of release fractions for research reactors and the selection 
thereof  
Whereas for NPPs the behaviour of fuel under accident conditions have been well 
studied, information of release fractions for research reactors is relatively scarce 
[STA92].   
The usefulness of information from NPP fuels is limited due to the differences in fuel 
type, power level and thermal-hydraulic conditions.  A first investigation indicates that 
using data from NPP fuel leads to an overestimation of the Source Terms.  Further 
research on this subject could be very useful for the research reactor community, in 
order to define more realistic Source Terms and to improve the emergency 
preparedness. 
This is also true for the plate-type fuel of the MTR reactor under observation.  It is 
mainly due to the uncertainty and variation in the physical core parameters during the 
envelope of the specific accident and implies that release fractions that are needed to 
arrive at source terms must be derived from literature on experiments done.  
  
2.5.3 Choice of 131I and release fraction for this study 
Although the heading of Section 2.5 refers to “Release Fractions”, for the present study 
the author has decided to investigate only one radioisotope, 131I.  In a full Level 2 
analysis each radioisotope would be assigned a release fraction.  Radioisotopes from the 
same element, e.g. 129I and 131I would be assigned the same release fraction, because of 
the exact similar chemical behaviour and physical behaviour as far as it is concerned 
with vapour pressure, volatility etc.  Therefore, different chemical elements are 
categorized according to volatility.  Experimental work done by e.g. Margeanu et al. 
[MAR07] and ORNL support the classification scheme that is done according to 
volatility.   
To continue the scenario where a full Level 2 analysis would be done, within the 
spectrum of radioisotopes that has formed (see Appendix C) each would be assigned a 
release fraction varying almost from 0%, in case of the actinide group (Group 8,  “NpO2 
and PuO2”), to 100%, in the case of the highly volatile group (Group 1, “Noble gas” and 
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Group 2, “I2, CsI, HBr”).  Each radioisotope’s activity (Bq), according to Table C.1 
must then be multiplied with its own release fraction to get a Total Source Term, should 
a complete Level 2 accident analysis be required.  Since the release fractions of Group 1 
and 2 are high and are also called collectively the highly volatile group [PAR73], the 
release of the noble gases and iodine compared to the rest of the radioisotopes dominate 
by far.  This implies that even during a severe accident like a LOCA, the less volatile 
radioisotopes would remain, to a large extent, in the core.     
Because the focus of the present study is to demonstrate how the MCNP code can be 
applied, it is more appropriate to choose one significant radioisotope.  Therefore, 131I 
which falls under the highly volatile group and is a large contributor to the dose of an 
exposed person during an accident has been chosen for the study.  Since the aim of the 
present study is not to do work to refine the release fractions based on previous data, the 
release fraction that was taken for 131I is 100% for the release into the reactor hall.  This 
is backed up by Margeanu et al. [MAR07] and ORNL data.    
The statements on the volatility of 131I, its contribution to dose during an accident and 
why in particular the 131I isotope of iodine, is further backed up by the following 
overview on iodine. 
General overview on iodine and justification for choice of 131I 
Iodine occurs in nature in various chemical forms, however not in the pure form, to a 
major extent in seawater and to lesser extent in rock.  Under standard conditions it is a 
bluish black solid [BRO09].  However, it needs to be heated slightly above room 
temperature in order to sublime.  Iodine in its gaseous form is violet-pink and has an 
irritating odour.  It forms compounds with many elements, but is less reactive than the 
other halogens.  There are 37 isotopes of iodine of which only one, the 127I isotope is 
stable.  Iodine is produced by extracting sodium iodate and sodium iodide from sodium 
nitrate or by purifying it from brine. It is used for a variety of applications, including 
diagnostic and medical treatment, photography and dyes used to perform colouring of 
substances.  Some overview is further given in this section on the medical uses of 
iodine, the radiotoxicity, chemical toxicology, volatility, plate-out and decay mode and 
a final conclusion is provided on the choice of 131I. 
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Iodine used in medical treatment 
Examples of where iodine is used for medical treatment are 125I which is used in 
biological assays and in radiation therapy to treat prostate cancer and brain tumours. 
This isotope is produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiation and consequent neutron 
activation of 124Xe.  Another isotope of iodine, 123I, is used in nuclear medicine imaging 
using it as tracer or to study the high linear energy transfer characteristics of Auger 
electrons [SLA98].  The latter isotope is produced in a cyclotron.  On the other hand, the 
neutron rich 131I isotope, that is produced in a nuclear reactor by fission, has both 
diagnostic and therapy uses.  The diagnostic uses include imaging and the therapy uses 
include procedures for thyroid disorders (e.g. where the thyroid is producing excessive 
hormones or when thyroid cancer is present).  The relatively short half-lives of these 
three isotopes are 59.4 days, 13 hours and 8.02 days for 125I, 123I and 131I, respectively, 
which makes them suitable for medical use. 
Radiotoxicity of iodine 
It is well known that iodine can be concentrated in the thyroid and can cause thyroid 
diseases.  Within the first hours after occurrence of a nuclear or radiation accident the 
radioactive 131I enters into the body mainly through inhalation and is rapidly taken up 
into the blood.  There are other pathways that are not of interest because they occur over 
the longer term, i.e. in Level 3 analysis where the iodine once released into the 
environment gets concentrated like in milk, for example.  Also, in the present study, the 
external and skin radiation is investigated, rather than the internal dose. 
The most important radioactive isotope of the iodine from radiation protection point of 
view is 131I to which a special attention is paid in case of nuclear or radiation accidents.  
Other radioactive isotopes as 133I and 135I also pose a health hazard but have shorter 
half-lives and for the internal exposure of the individual their contribution is smaller in 
comparison with 131I.  In addition, 129I is also formed but has a very long half-life (15.7 
million years) and hence a low specific activity.  It should be noted that 131I was also a 
significant contributor to the health effects of the Chernobyl disaster [WIL08] and was 
also shown to be the case during weapons testing e.g. at the Hanford Site in the USA.  
Iodine  Prophylaxis,  normally  in  the  form  of  potassium  iodine  (KI)  tablets,  is  a 
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preventive protection measure aimed at avoiding the health damage to individuals 
resulting from the accumulation of radioactive iodine in the thyroid.  The tablets, 
containing stable (not radioactive) iodine are taken prior to or up to two hours after 
exposure during an accident in order to saturate the thyroid with stable iodine thus 
avoiding the incorporation of radioactive iodine into the gland. 
131I, with a half-life of 8.02 days, emits a few high energy γ-photons as can be seen from 
Table 2.3.  This is of importance to the external whole body dose received by an 
exposed person.  The distance travelled in air by photons increases with the energy.  
Therefore, it can be expected that a person standing in or within a distance of 
approximately 1 m of a 131I cloud would receive a large external dose, compared to a 
person standing several metre away.  The latter person would only be affected by the 
very high energy photons.  This will be shown by the results in Chapter 3. 
Chemical Toxicity 
Elemental iodine is an oxidising irritant.  When the iodine is in crystal form, direct 
contact with the skin can cause lesions.   Contact with solutions of iodine can cause 
tissue damage at prolonged contact.  If ingested, a few grams can be lethal,  Iodine 
vapour is very irritating to the eye, to mucous membranes and in the respiratory tract.  
Limits exist of allowable iodine concentration in the air.  A so-called “iodine 
sensitivity” can be developed by some people.  Therefore, also out of a pure chemical 
toxicology perspective, iodine is a noticeable hazard. 
Volatility and plate-out 
Iodine suffers from low solubility in water and its volatility makes it difficult to handle 
directly.  According to the classification scheme proposed by Parker and Barton 
[PAR73], iodine is in the high volatility group.   Therefore, it is expected to stay in the 
form of a gas cloud for a relatively long time while in the reactor hall.  After a while, 
however, the iodine plate-out against the building surfaces, e.g. walls.  The plate-out of 
iodine is a well studied subject as shown by e.g. Clough and Hood [CLO85, NEE97] 
and the time it takes to plate-out may vary between a few hours to a few days, 
depending on the physical phenomena resulting in varying surface temperatures during 
and after the accident. 
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Decay mode and scheme for 131I 
131I decays in the following manner: 
131I  131Xe + β– + . (2.3) 
The decay scheme, showing the modes of decay for photons and β–-particles and the 
accompanying energies when emitted is shown in Fig. 2.15. 
 
Figure 2.15: The decay scheme of 131I [ICR83]. 
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Radiation emitted by 131I 
The results of the decay of 131I are shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.   Here, in 
Table 2.3, γ1 represents the transition depicted in Fig. 2.15 labelled γ1 having an energy 
Eγ1 = 0.0802 MeV.  Similary, Kand K represent the x-rays that are produced due to 
electrons that move from a higher orbit (in this case to the K-shell) and follows the 
Siegbahn notation.   
In Table 2.4, the energies and branching fractions of the electrons emitted by 131I are 
shown.  	
 to 
 shows the average energies of the β–-particles emitted as indicated in 
Fig. 2.15.  Also, for example, CEK, γ1 represents a conversion electron originating from 
the K-shell and is competing with γ-transition γ1 as depicted in Fig. 2.15, resulting in an 
electron of energy  , γ	 = 0.04562 MeV with binding energy of the K-shell electron 
having been taken into account.  The conversion electrons, in contrast to the continuous 
energy distribution of the β–-particles, have a sharp energy peak. 
The energies and branching fractions for photons and electrons emitted by 131I as shown 
in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, respectively, were obtained from ICRP Publication 38 [ICR83].  
The sums of the branching fractions add up to 1.0404 and 1.0596 for Tables 2.3 and 2.4, 
respectively, and not to exactly one.  This due to experimental uncertainties in 
measurements of the branching fractions [ICR83] and is accounted for in the MCNP 
calculations by normalizing it to one. 
Summary of choice of 131I 
Although a variety of isotopes are available due to the fission process, 131I was chosen 
for a variety of reasons.  As said previously, the 131I isotope is well known to contribute 
to a large percentage of dose during an accident.  Although other isotopes are more 
radiotoxic and have a longer half-life, e.g. 92Sr, the release fractions of these isotopes 
are considerably lower.  Of the noble gases only the external radiation of these is of 
importance.  Because they are quite volatile, they are also expected to leave the building 
sooner than iodine and, therefore, are not considered such a great risk to an emergency 
worker than iodine.  Iodine can stay in the reactor hall for a longer time and can 
plate-out against the surfaces, e.g. walls, of the reactor hall.  It is, thus, more probable 
that an emergency worker would be exposed to iodine than to the noble gases. 
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Table 2.3: Photon energies and branching fractions emitted during the radioactive 
transformation of 131I [ICR83], see also Fig. 2.15. 
 
Origin of 
Radiation  
Photon Energy 
(MeV) 
Branching Fraction  
(no units) 
γ1 8.018 x 10-2 2.62 x 10-2 
γ4 1.772 x 10-1 2.65 x 10-3 
γ7 2.843 x 10-1 6.06 x 10-2 
γ12 3.258 x 10-1 2.51 x 10-3 
γ14 3.645 x 10-1 8.12 x 10-1 
γ16 5.030 x 10-1 3.61 x 10-3 
γ17 6.370 x 10-1 7.27 x 10-2 
γ18 6.427 x 10-1 2.20 x 10-3 
γ19 7.229 x 10-1 1.80 x 10-2 K 2.978 x 10-2 2.59 x 10-2 K 2.946 x 10-2 1.40 x 10-2 
 
Table 2.4: Electron energies and branching fractions emitted during the radioactive 
transformation of 131I [ICR83], see also Fig. 2.15. 
 
Origin of 
Radiation 
Electron Energy 
(MeV) 
Branching fraction  
(no units) 
	
 0.06935 0.0213 

 0.08693 0.0062 
 0.09660 0.0736 

 0.19150 0.8940 

 0.28320 0.0042 
CEK, γ1 0.04562 0.0363 
CE , γ	 0.07473 0.0043 
CEK, γ7 0.24970 0.0025 
CEK, γ14 0.32290 0.0155 
CE , γ	 0.35900 0.0017 
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2.6 An analytical method derived for comparison with MCNP  
Whilst MCNP was used as the main method for calculating the external photon and 
electron doses to a worker, another method was used to show the adequacy of the 
MCNP code results. 
This method uses a hemispherically shaped cloud of 131I in an open space of air.  A dose 
receptor is placed at the origin of the hemispherical cloud.  An analytical equation for 
calculating the dose to the receptor was developed by Van Rooyen [ROO03].  The 
analytical equation was solved numerically using the computer programme MathCad 
[MAT05].   
The contribution of photon radiation of each discrete volume dV of gas to the person 
(receptor) standing in the centre of the cloud is added.  This method is very similar to 
the so-called “point kernel method”.  The analytical method is explained below.   
 
Figure 2.16: A schematic representation of parameters involved in the analytical 
method derived for comparison with MCNP for a Hemispherical Cloud 
of 131I. 
 
Figure 2.16 represent the hemispherical cloud of 131I and the space parameters involved.  
A small discrete volume dV is shown, made up by three dimensions, which are 
r
drθ
Ø
dV
R
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functions of the radial distance r, the polar angel , and the azimuthal angle .  The 
radioactivity of 131I in each dV results in defined dose rate d  at the receptor at the 
origin.  The  ’s are integrated to get the total dose rate   received by the receptor.   
To calculate  , a method is first derived to calculate d .  The starting point of the 
derivation will be to obtain the dose dD per decay disintegration, which will then be 
related to d .  To simplify the calculation, dD is given for a vacuum, after which the 
effect of the attenuating medium (air) is brought into effect.   
In Fig. 2.16, the volume of infinitesimal dV is given by: 
      ! sin   &. (2.4) 
Different energy photons emitted in the decay of 131I have a different resultant dose at 
the receptor.  Therefore, the energies of the photons and the corresponding branching 
fraction, as given in Table 2.3, must be taken into account.  The flux at a distance r from 
the point source dV is inversely proportional to .  Due to the inverse square law, the 
dose due to a particular energy photon dDi can be calculated as: 
    
 
 !ℜ!'&  (' &   
  , (2.5)4* 
 
where ℜ(Ei) is the flux-to-dose conversion factor as a function of photon energy, 
obtained from [ANS91a] and Yi  the branching fraction of the specific photon energy. 
Then, the total dose dD from the activity in dV can then be given as: 
   / !ℜ!'&  (' &0'1	      , (2.6)   
 
 4* 
 
where n is the total number of distinct energy photons emitted as given in Table 2.3. 
 
If the same case is now to be viewed bringing into account the effect of the attenuating 
medium and, in particular, the effect of absorption of photons (see Section 2.3.3), 
Eq. (2.6) can be adjusted to: 
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   / 2ℜ!'&  ('   e!
34  5&60'1	      , (2.7)   
 
 4* 
 
where 7' is the linear attenuation coefficient of air for photon energy i. 
 
If the effect of build-up, due to scattering (as explained in Section 2.3.3) is to be 
included, the Build-up Factor (B), as a function of Ei, the radius (r) and the mean free 
path (mfpi) of the specific energy photon, can be included in Eq. (2.7) as follows: 
  /82ℜ!'&  ('   e!
34  5&6  9 :', mfp>?@ 
0
'1	
 
  , (2.8)   
 
 4* 
 
where 
mfp>  17' . (2.9) 
 
In order to define the dose rate, the activity (in Bq) in dV must be known.  The activity 
concentration in the cloud (Ac), calculated as if homogenously distributed in the cloud, 
based on the total activity is given by:  
 
BC  BDEFGH  , (2.10) 
where 
BDEFGH = the total activity in the hemispherical cloud and 
V = the volume of an hemisphere with radius R (Fig. 2.16). 
 
The activity (dAc) in dV is the activity concentration (Ac) in the hemisphere multiplied 
by dV: 
dAc  Ac x dV  . !2.11& 
As already indicated, dD is the dose (expressed in Sv) per disintegration.  The number 
of disintegrations in dV is given by dAc (units in Bq or s-1, which imply disintegrations 
per second) and therefore   can be written as: 
   dAc x dD . !2.12& 
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Combining Eq. (2.8) and Eq. (2.12) gives: 
 
  /82ℜ!'&  ('   e!
34  5&6  9 :', mfp>?@ 
0
'1	
 
  . (2.13)   BQ   
 
 
 4* 
 
Substituting Eq. (2.4) and Eq. (2.11) into Eq. (2.13) gives: 
   BQ       ! sin   &  /82ℜ!'&  ('   e!
34  5&6  9 :' , mfp>?@ 
0
'1	
. (2.14)4* 
 
To obtain the total contribution ( ) of each dV to the receptor at the origin, integration 
has to take place over the radius (r),  and .  Taking into account that the integral of 
 from 0 to 2pi gives 2pi, and that the integral of sin    from 0 to * 2R  gives 1, the 
following integral is obtained to calculate  : 
   12BQ   S T/82ℜ!'&  ('   e!
34  5&6  9 :',
mfp>?@ 
0
'1	
UVW .  (2.15)
 
The total dose rate to a receptor at the origin or to a person standing in the middle of a 
hemispherical cloud is therefore determined.  The results of the numerical solution of 
Eq. (2.15) are presented in Chapter 3.  An exact representation of such a case was also 
duplicated, for comparison, in the MCNP code and the result is also presented in 
Chapter 3. 
 
2.7 The MCNP Code 
The Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) code is an internationally recognized code for 
analysing the transport of photons and neutrons.  The code is developed and maintained 
by the Los Alamos National Laboratory [SHU07].   In addition to analysing the 
transport of photons and neutrons, the transport of secondary γ-ray photons resulting 
from neutron interactions are treated.  The transport of electrons can also be treated, 
both as primary particles and secondary particles resulting from photon interactions.  
Protons can also be handled. 
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The code can be used for many applications e.g. accelerator applications (neutron and 
photon transport), detector design, radiation protection, nuclear medicine, 
radiochemistry, reactor core calculations (mainly neutron transport), criticality 
calculations, tomography and radioactive waste handling and disposal.  In the case of 
this study, the code was not used for reactor-core neutron transport calculations but for 
photon and electron transport resulting from the 131I that was released from the reactor 
core due to the accident defined. 
The programme can be used for calculating dose rates, fluence rates, criticality 
parameters, energy deposition and radiation damage.  Dose rates were calculated in the 
model prepared for the present study.   
 
2.7.1 A brief description of the Monte Carlo radiation transport method applied 
by the MCNP code  
MCNP is a probabilistic radiation transport code that simulates real particle transport by 
following track lengths (with probabilistic length distribution), reaction type distribution 
(probability dictated by real branching ratios) and scattering direction (distributed as per 
reaction type specifics) at each vertex, for many particles. This includes primary and 
secondary particles created at the vertices. Real cross-section data from extensively 
tabulated and up-dated files provides realistic radiation related quantities such as dose 
rate, provided that a sufficient number of particle tracks have been followed. 
To explain the principle of tracing particles through a system, a simple diagram, shown 
in Fig. 2.16, has been set up.  The diagram represents a concrete building where photons 
originated from a gaseous source that is present inside the air volume.  The  movements 
of these are tracked individually.  Some photons interact with the air.  Other photons 
interact with the concrete.  Other photons leave the building to the “Outer world” 
outside the building where it may not be necessary to track them anymore.  The 
interactions that can take place for each photon in the materials, air and concrete, are 
absorption and scattering as explained in Section 2.3.3.  Cross-section data, which is the 
probability of a certain interaction at a given photon energy, are used by the MCNP 
code to determine the interaction history of each particle.  The history for each particle 
is recorded. 
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Figure 2.17: Diagram to show the principle of tracing particles through a system. 
 
In a sense, MCNP is the closest thing to a real-life particle random-walk simulation. It 
gives very realistic results that include extremely complicated scattering behaviour such 
as build-up effects, hot-spots, spectral characteristics, distribution of radiation types, etc.  
As such, the code has the ability to follow millions of individual particle tracks over a 
region with almost arbitrary complex composition and geometry and the dose (for 
primary or secondary radiation) can then be tallied up where needed. The disadvantage 
lies in the fact that an extreme number of starting particles need to be followed to 
provide enough statistics for an accurate dose calculation in certain areas, such as areas 
behind high attenuation shielding. There exist enhancement techniques to increase 
statistics in MCNP to accelerate calculations in such cases.  This is called “Variance 
reduction”. 
If one could determine the exact path each particle makes and energies it assumes while 
passing through a medium in its random-walk fashion, one could, in principle, calculate 
many useful quantities by averaging over a large number of individual particle histories 
so as to minimise the stochastic effects of the individual particle interactions. For 
example, the probability that a particle in a certain energy range will be absorbed in a 
certain volume could be estimated by computing the proportion of all particles, in the 
specific energy group, that terminates in the specified volume. This concept of using a 
Particles originated from  gaseous 
source in the air volume
Scattering
Absorption 
in air Absorption 
in concrete
Particle that do not interact and escape to the 
"Outer world"
(low probability for thick concrete)
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large number of particle histories, each of which is random in nature, to estimate some 
average particle behaviour, is the essential feature of the Monte Carlo method.  
In Monte Carlo calculations, the particle tracks or histories are generated by simulating 
the random nature of the particle interactions with the medium. To do this, one requires 
mathematical expressions for the probability relationships which govern the track length 
of an individual particle between interaction points, the choice of an interaction type at 
each such point, the choice of a new energy and a new direction if the interaction is of a 
scattering type, and the possible production of additional particles. These are all 
stochastic variables.  One needs a complete understanding of the physics of the various 
processes a particle undergoes in its lifetime from the time it is born in the source until 
it is either absorbed or leaves the system under consideration, in order to make 
selections of the specific values for these variables.  
In some cases, there are equations that adequately describe the behaviour of such 
systems and that can be solved either analytically or numerically. The question is asked 
why Monte Carlo methods are used. 
Comparison with deterministic methods 
The fundamental advantage of Monte Carlo techniques over deterministic techniques 
(i.e. numerical solutions to the Boltzmann Transport Equation (BTE)), is that Monte 
Carlo techniques more accurately represent the geometry and the nuclear data than 
deterministic techniques. Deterministic techniques require reasonably simple geometries 
for the numerical technique to work, and use the multigroup approximation to 
cross-section data. Monte Carlo techniques can handle complex geometries and 
continuous cross-section data (as well as simple geometry and multigroup data). The 
disadvantage of the Monte Carlo technique is that it is statistical in nature and does not 
provide an exact solution to the problem. All results represent estimates with associated 
uncertainties. Also, Monte Carlo techniques can be quite time-consuming on a computer 
if small uncertainties are required. 
The relationship between Monte Carlo techniques and deterministic techniques is: 
deterministic techniques provide a highly exact solution to a significantly simplified 
 65
approximation of the problem, while Monte Carlo techniques provide an approximate 
solution to a highly exact representation of the problem.  
The Monte Carlo code MCNP operates very differently from deterministic transport 
methods and codes. Deterministic methods, the most common of which is the Discrete 
Ordinate Method [SHU07], solve the Boltzmann transport equation for the average 
particle behaviour.  In contrast, MCNP does not solve an explicit equation, but rather 
obtains answers by simulating individual particles histories and recording some aspects 
(tallies) of their behaviour. The average behaviour of particles in the physical system is 
then inferred using the central limit theorem from the average behaviour of the 
simulated particles. MCNP supplies information only about specific tallies requested by 
the user.  
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CHAPTER 3 – APPLICATION OF THE MCNP CODE TO 131I ACCIDENT CONDITIONS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
APPLICATION OF THE MCNP CODE TO 131I 
ACCIDENT CONDITIONS, RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
The main aim of this chapter is to provide results that were obtained from calculation 
with the complete MCNP model, representing the reactor hall.   
The comparison of the calculation of the dose to a receptor situated at the origin of a 
hemispherical cloud will be, however, presented first.  This includes the results of both 
the numerical solution of the analytical method presented in Section 2.6 and those of a 
simple MCNP model representing only a hemispherical 131I cloud with a receptor at the 
origin.  The results of these are presented in Section 3.1.  Thereafter, a simple MCNP 
example that contains the necessary principles is given in Section 3.2.   The complete 
MCNP model will then be presented in Section 3.3.   
External photon dose calculations using the complete MCNP model will be presented in 
Section 3.4.  For these calculations, it was important to optimize the running time.  
Therefore, a run to establish the optimum running time was first performed.  Thereafter, 
runs with varying radii of the 131I cloud originated from above the reactor pool were 
performed.  The dose rates to eight persons at different positions in the reactor hall, 
called phantoms in the calculations, were obtained and compared for varying radii of the 
131I cloud.  The results were also compared with the dose rates and doses to eight 
persons at the same position, but assuming that the complete reactor hall is filled with 
the same amount of 131I activity, i.e. that the 131I has dispersed to fill the entire reactor 
hall.  The photon calculations represent the external photon dose obtained by persons in 
the reactor hall during the time of the accident. 
Finally, in Section 3.5, electron β–-decay calculations representing the skin dose to 
persons at the same positions are presented.  This was done for a 131I cloud of fixed radii 
and compared with the results when the complete reactor hall is filled with 131I.   
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3.1 Comparison of analytical method with MCNP using a 
hemispherical cloud 
3.1.1 Solving the analytical method 
As stated in Section 2.6, the analytical method (Eq. 2.15) developed for calculating the 
dose rate at a receptor placed at the origin of a hemispherical 131I cloud was solved 
numerically with MathCad.  The input parameters are summarized in Table 3.1. 
The total activity (BDEFGH) of the 131I cloud used is these of a 26 fuel element reactor core 
and was taken from Table C.1 of Appendix C as 1.04 x 1016 Bq.  Therefore, the activity 
concentration is given by Eq. 2.10 as: 
   
 
 1.04 x 10	 YBq\  
    3.10 x 1011  YBq m^3\  . (2.5) 4*   20 Ym\ 
 3 
 
Table 3.1: Input parameters for the MathCad model of the analytical method. 
Symbol Parameter Value Units 
R Radius of Hemisphere 20 m 
ATotal Total activity in Hemisphere 1.04 x 1016 Bq 
Ac Activity Concentration in Cloud 3.10 x 1011 Bq m-3 
Ei Energies of Photons emitted by 131I Obtained from Table 2.3 MeV 
Yi Branching Fractions of Photons Obtained from Table 2.3 no units 
ℜ!'& Flux-to-Dose conversions factors Obtained from [ANS91a] Sv cm2 
B Built-up factor Obtained from [ANS91b] no units 
7' Linear attenuation coefficient Obtained from [BER98] m-1 
 
In the numerical solution of Eq. (2.15), compensation was made in the MathCad model 
for the consistent treatment of units.  Also, a tolerance of 10-12 was set for the results of 
two consecutive runs to fall within.  The programme starts to calculate the integral with 
initial values set.  It then does another run and compares the answer with the previous 
answer to be within the tolerance.  Continuing runs are performed until the difference in 
consecutive runs is within the tolerance.  As can be seen, the tolerance is rather small 
and the accuracy of the answer of a high degree.  The dose rate that was obtained is 
4.405 Sv h-1. 
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3.1.2 Results of simple MCNP model representing same geometry  
As also stated in Section 2.6, an exact representation of the hemispherical 131I cloud 
with a receptor at the origin was duplicated in the MCNP code for comparison.  The 
results of a calculation done in one minute computer running time yielded a dose rate of 
4.443 Sv h-1 with an error of 0.69%. 
As can be seen from the above two calculated dose rates, the results of the two 
independent methods compare very favourably.  This mean that although the MCNP 
code are widely applied and could therefore be applied with a large amount of 
confidence, the MCNP code can be regarded as suitable for this study.  
 
3.2 A short explanation of how the MCNP code works with an 
example  
In order to better explain the operation of the code and in preparation for understanding 
the actual model of the reactor and building, an example has been chosen that is 
relatively simple, but contains the necessary principles. 
A box representing a building has been defined.  Inside the building is a phantom, 
representing a human being.  Shown in Fig. 3.1 is a representation of a vertical cut 
through the building and phantom.  
Defining the Cell and Surface cards 
The “Surfaces” of the model need to be defined in order to establish the boundaries of 
the bodies, called “Cells”.  To define the boundaries of the concrete walls, floor and 
roof of the building, an inner and outer box, corresponding to surfaces 2 and 3, 
respectively, have been defined.  A cylindrical surface (Surface 1), defining the outside 
boundary of the phantom, has been placed right at the middle of the floor.  A fourth 
surface (Surface 4) defines the outside boundary of the surrounding air.  The 
information pertaining to surfaces can be found in the MCNP input data set generated as 
an example and is called “Surface Cards”. 
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Figure 3.1: Sketch of Box MCNP Example. 
 
The inner box’s length is 1000 cm, the width is 600 cm and the height 300 cm.  The 
MCNP code requires dimensions in centimetres as input data, while densities are in g 
cm-3.  The phantom is 170 cm high with a diameter of 23 cm. 
The dimensions of the surfaces are defined in the MCNP input file according to a 
Cartesian coordinate system.  The origin of this axial system can be chosen by the user.  
For this example, the origin is chosen at point C as indicated in Fig. 3.2.  It would have 
been easier to set the origin at e.g. point A or point B.  In the case of the origin being 
chosen at point A, the X dimensions would have been:  Xmin = 0 cm and Xmax = 600 cm.  
The Y and Z dimensions would have been Ymin = 0 cm, Ymax = 1000 cm and Zmin = 0 
cm, Zmax = 300 cm. 
However, for compatibility with other radiation codes, e.g. with the point-kernel code 
QAD-GCCP, it is common to set the origin of the Cartesian coordinate system at a place 
like point C, which is at the bottom centre of the cylinder.  This would have been 
needed, if the cylinder had defined the outside boundaries of a radioactive source, which 
is often the case.   
Cell 1 
(Phantom)
Surface 1
Cell 2 (Air)
Surface 4 Surface 3
Surface 2
Cell 2 
(Concrete)
Cell 4 (Air outside building)
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Figure 3.2: Box MCNP Example – Cartesian system. 
 
The next step in developing an MCNP input model, after defining the Surface “Cards”, 
is to define the “Cells” (called “Cell Cards”). All space is composed of contiguous 
volumes or cells [SHU07].    The surfaces are only the dimensions or constraints set as a 
framework to define bodies (cells) within.  The cells in this example are the building 
walls (Cell 3, constrained by the inner and outer boxes) and the cylindrical phantom 
(Cell 1, constrained by the outer surface of the cylinder).  Another cell (Cell 2) is 
defined as the air within the inner box but outside the cylinder.  Cell 2 is filled with 1311 
from where the cylindrical phantom receives its dose.  The last two cells (Cell 4 and 99) 
are defined as the air outside the building but within Surface 4 and the “outside world” 
outside Surface 4, where the MCNP input data set defines the importance of tracing of 
particle movement as zero.   
At this point, the part of input data set containing the Cell and Surface cards is shown in 
Table 3.2.  Because of the history of the development of the MCNP code, the Cell cards 
appear first, before the Surface cards, and not the other way around, which would have 
been more logical. 
The first line contains the title, “MCNP Example”.  The second line contains a comment 
for the user of the MCNP  programme  to  remember  that  Cell  cards  follow.  All  text 
Z
Y
X
A B
C
Floor of Building 
(Bottom of Inner Box)
Cylinder 
Lenght = 1000 cm
Width = 600 cm
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Table 3.2: MCNP Input Data Set – Cell and Surface cards. 
 MCNP Example 
 c Cell Cards 
 01  1  -1         -1       imp:p=1  $  Phanton 
 02  2  -1.21E-3   +1  -2   imp:p=1  $  Air in Room (I-131 filled) 
 03  3  -2.35      +2  -3   imp:p=1  $  Concrete Wall 
 04  2  -1.21E-3   +3  -4   imp:p=1  $  Outer Air 
 99  0             +4       imp:p=0  $  Umwelt (Outer world) 
 
 c Surface cards 
 01  RCC  0 0 0   0 0 170  11.5         $  Phanton 
 02  RPP  -300 300  -500 500    0  300  $  Inner wall 
 03  RPP  -330 330  -530 530   -30 330  $  Outer wall 
 04  RPP  -400 400  -600 600  -100 400  $  Outer air border 
 
 
following the letter “c” in a line is regarded as comments and is not used by the 
programme.   
The third line contains the first Cell card, the fourth line the second Cell card and so on.  
The numbers of the Cell card in the third line are explained as an example.   
• If virtual columns are assigned to the numbers in this line, the number 01 is in 
the first “column”.  This is the number of the cell, given arbitrary, but in 
sequential order.  It does not make a difference whether it is captured as 1 or 01 
in the input data set.   
• The number in the second “column” is the material number that “fills” the cell, 
in this case material number one, which is tissue equivalent material.  The 
materials are later defined in the input data set.   
• The number in the third “column”, in this case 1, indicates the density of the 
material and the negative sign means that the units are in g cm-3.   
• The fourth “column” is reserved for reference to the surface numbers that forms 
the boundaries of the cell.  A negative sign means that the cell is inside the 
applicable surface and a positive sign that the cell is outside the surface.  The -1 
in this case thus means that Cell 01 is inside Surface 1, which is a cylinder 
(called an RCC).   
• The importance of tracing particles in the particular cell is set in the fifth 
“column”.  Everything after the $ sign is also regarded as comments. 
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The Surface cards follow the Cell cards.  Again, the Surface number follows first. 
Thereafter the type of macrobody is defined.  An RPP is a rectangular box.  In the case 
of an RPP, the x, y and z coordinates are defined in the order xmin, xmax, ymin, ymax and 
zmin, zmax.  In the case of an RCC surface, the x, y, and z coordinates of the bottom 
centre are defined, thereafter the x, y and z coordinates relative to the origin and 
thereafter the radius. 
Defining the Data cards 
After the Cell and Surface cards, the Data cards follow. These contains radioactive 
source information, material information, the way in which the photons are counted or 
tallied etc.  The first part of the Data cards region, i.e. the source definition, is presented 
in Table 3.3.  The mode of transport is set to p (photons).  The “sdef” cards contain the 
summary of the source definition.  The particle to be tracked is photons (par=p).  The 
energies of the photons and emitted by the 131I source and its corresponding branching 
fractions (abundances) are provided in distribution 4 (erg=d4).  The energies in MeV are 
found after “si4 L” and the corresponding branching fractions after “sp4”.  Note that the 
photon energies and corresponding branching fractions for 131I were obtained from 
Table 2.3 and are also used for the complete model described in Section 3.3.  Sampling, 
i.e. tracing of particles originating from the source volume, is restricted to distributions 
1, 2 and 3 (x = d1, y = d2, z = d3) for the x, y and z dimensions, respectively. 
The remainder of the Data cards, namely the Material and Tally cards, are shown in 
Table 3.4.  Each material is specified by means of defining the atomic numbers and 
mass or atomic fraction of each element it is made up of.  For example, material 1 (m1) 
contains oxygen, with atomic number 8 represented by 8000.  The mass fraction, 
indicated by the negative sign, is 6.143 x 10-1.  A positive sign would have meant an 
atomic fraction. 
The text following the “fc16” is the Tally cards.   This defines the way in which the 
particles arriving at the counting position, in this case defined by the phantom which is 
Cell 1, must be counted.   The 1 in “fc16” means that it is Tally number 1 (more than 
one tally can be defined) and the 6 means that it is a tally of type F6, which implies that 
energy deposition due to photon interaction is measured.  The MCNP codes provide, for 
 73
Table 3.3: MCNP Input Data Set – Data cards – Source definition. 
 c Data Cards 
 c Mode: transport photons 
 mode p 
 sdef par=p erg=d4 x=d1 y=d2 z=d3   
 si1   -300 300   
 sp1   0   1      
 si2   -500 500   
 sp2   0   1      
 si3   0  300     
 sp3   0   1      
 si4 L  2.946E-02  2.978E-02  8.018E-02  1.772E-01  2.843E-01 
        3.258E-01  3.645E-01  5.030E-01  6.370E-01  6.427E-01 
        7.229E-01 
 sp4    1.400E-02  2.590E-02  2.620E-02  2.650E-03  6.060E-02 
        2.510E-03  8.120E-01  3.610E-03  7.270E-02  2.200E-03 
        1.800E-02 
 
type F6 tally, the units of energy position in MeV/g. If it is further assumed that the 
source emits particles at a certain tempo per second, corresponding to its activity in Bq, 
the MCNP units become MeV/g/s.  The answer must, therefore, be multiplied by the 
Tally Multiplication Factor of 2.2201 x 104 to arrive at Gy/h which the code does.  Gy/h 
is equivalent to Sv/h, and can be used as a measure of radiation damage due to energy 
deposition of the ionizing radiation. 
The running time is defined in the input data set and is in this case 10 minutes (indicated 
by “ctme 10”).  By running the code, an output data set is generated. 
 
3.3 Setting up the complete MCNP model  
After some explanation of the MCNP code by way of a simple example applicable to 
the field it was applied to in this study, the complete model will now be introduced.  
The input data set for 131I external radiation photon tracking is presented in Appendix B.  
Here reference was made to old drawings on which the dimensions were still indicated 
in inches – since the reactor was built in the 1960s – obtained from the NECSA Nuclear 
Facilities’ Drawing Office.  The main dimensions of the “reactor hall”, the large room 
in which the reactor pool has been built, have been identified.  To make provision for 
the proper simulation of particles with MCNP, the concrete shielding and outside walls, 
floor and roof of the reactor building had to be defined.  For each of these parts of the 
reactor hall an inner and outer surface card  had to  be  defined;  the  inner  surface  card 
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Table 3.4: MCNP Input Data Set – Remainder of Data cards. 
 c Material Data 
 m1     8000    -6.143E-01      $ TEM = Tissue-Equivalent Material 
        6000    -2.286E-01      $ TEM  
        1000    -1.000E-01      $ TEM   
        7000    -2.571E-02      $ TEM  
       20000    -1.429E-02      $ TEM  
       15000    -1.114E-02      $ TEM  
       19000    -2.000E-03      $ TEM  
       16000    -2.000E-03      $ TEM  
       11000    -1.429E-03      $ TEM  
       17000    -1.357E-03      $ TEM  
       12000    -2.714E-04      $ TEM  
       26000    -6.000E-05      $ TEM  
 m2     6000    -1.24E-4        $ Air, dry.   
        7000    -0.755267       $ Air, dry.   
        8000    -0.231781       $ Air, dry.   
       18000    -0.012827       $ Air, dry.   
 m3     1000    -0.013          $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
        8000    -1.165          $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
       11000    -0.040          $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
       12000    -0.010          $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
       13000    -0.108          $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
       14000    -0.740          $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
       16000    -0.003          $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
       19000    -0.045          $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
       20000    -0.196          $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
       26000    -0.030          $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
 c 
 fc16 Photon Absorbed Dose Rate inside the Phantoms 
 +f16  1    $ Tally 1 
 fm16  2.2201E4  $For comparison to 3.7E10 Bq = 1 Ci 
 c 
 c ============== 
 PRINT 10 40 50 60 72 100 110 120 170 200 
 c ============== 
 ctme 10 
 
being the inside surface of the wall and the outer surface card being the outside surface 
of the wall.  The walls of the reactor hall are 30 cm thick.  Therefore, a much larger 
number of cells and surfaces were now defined.   
A “source” cell, containing the radioactivity is also defined but is, in this case, either a 
hemispherical cloud of 131I above the reactor pool or the whole reactor hall filled with 
131I gas.  The materials of construction, mainly high density concrete of the building 
structure and aluminium for the reactor vessel were included in the definitions of the 
cells. 
A vertical cross section of the reactor hall, as would be generated by the MCNP 
geometrical plotter, is shown in Fig. 3.3. 
 75
Eight “phantoms” consisting of tissue equivalent material, representing the workers that 
would potentially perform an emergency task or be accidentally trapped during an 
accident, were placed in the reactor hall as shown in Fig. 3. 4. 
Additional drawings, with cross sections in other locations in the reactor hall are shown 
in Appendix A. 
 
3.3.1 Source Term input part of the MCNP model  
The available radioactive inventory of 131I was taken, for a 26 fuel element reactor core, 
from Table C.1 of Appendix C as 1.04 x 1016 Bq.  The release fraction was selected in 
Section 2.5.3 as 1.  The radioactive inventory multiplied by the release fraction 
therefore provides a source term of 1.04 x 1016 Bq of 131I.  The energies and branching 
fractions for photons and electrons emitted by 131I were obtained from Tables 2.3 and 
2.4, respectively.  A tally multiplication factor of 6.24 x 109 s-1 was derived for type F6 
tallies. 
 
3.4 External photon dose results obtained with complete MCNP 
model 
The complete MCNP model presented in Section 3.3 developed to determine photon 
and electron doses was executed using various parameters.  In a real accident scenario, 
where radiological exposure from 131I is of importance, a large part of the 131I dose 
accrued by an exposed person is internal dose, specifically, thyroid dose.  It has been, 
however, assumed that for the emergency scenarios investigated in the present study, 
that the emergency worker wears appropriate protecting clothing and, in particular, 
breathing apparatus that reduces thyroid intake by, typically, factors of a 100 to 10 000.  
It is, therefore, appropriate to evaluate the external dose rate for an emergency scenario 
where doses to the emergency workers are of importance. 
As mentioned in the introductory paragraph of Chapter 3, the first step in evaluating the 
external doses was to optimize the running time.  Therefore, a run to establish the 
optimum running time was first performed.  Because  of  the  complexity  of  the  model 
Figure 3.3: A vertical cross Section of the reactor hall generated by the MCNP 
geometrical plotter
Figure 3.4: Eight phantoms representing workers 
reactor hall. 
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. 
placed at different positions in the 
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and the amount of concrete for shielding and structural purposes, the running times to 
arrive at an acceptable error had to be investigated in this step and is presented in the 
following section.  
 
3.4.1 Determination of optimum MCNP model running time with a 
hemispherical cloud of radius 250 cm 
A 131I cloud with a radius of 250 cm was chosen to perform runs to determine the 
optimum running time.  A representation of a cross section through the reactor hall with 
250 cm radius 131I cloud arising from the pool is shown in Fig. 3.5.  In this chapter, 
where a hemispherical cloud is considered, it is always assumed that the activity of 
1.04 x 1016 Bq as obtained in Chapter 2, is distributed homogeneously throughout the 
cloud.  The external photon dose rates obtained with consequent MCNP runs are shown 
in Table 3.5.   The associated errors are shown in Table 3.6. 
From Table 3.5 it can be seen that the dose rates for all eight phantoms are already in 
the correct order of magnitude when compared to the results of longer processor running 
times.  However, from Table 3.6, it can be seen that after a 2 minute run, large errors (in 
the region of 30%) still exist for the phantoms further away from the source.   
In contrast, it can be seen that the error associated with Phantom 1, partially submerged 
into the cloud, is very small (1.5%) already after a short run of 2 minutes.  This can be 
explained by the fact that many photons have “hit” the phantom in this time due to the 
short distance and have been absorbed into the phantom.  Considering 4% as a 
maximum approximate acceptable error, it was decided to use 120 minutes as a 
benchmark processor run time for further runs determining photon dose rates from a 
hemispherical 131I cloud of varying radius. 
 
3.4.2 External photon dose Rates with a hemispherical cloud of varying radii 
The purpose of these runs was to determine the doses to workers in the different 
positions as the size of the hemispherical 131I cloud emerging from the pool increases 
with time as postulated during the accident. 
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Various runs starting with a radius of 150 cm and ending with a radius of 950 cm were 
performed.  Here, for a hemispherical cloud, it is always assumed that the activity of 
1.04 x 1016 Bq as obtained in Chapter 2 is distributed homogeneously throughout the 
cloud, regardless of the cloud radius chosen. To get a visual picture of when the radius 
of the cloud reaches 950 cm, it can be seen in Fig. 3.6 that both Phantoms 1 and 2 are 
completely submerged into the cloud.  It is also of interest to note that at this stage some 
time has passed since the accident sequence has started.  The results of these runs are 
presented in Table 3.7.  The associated errors were all acceptable and are not presented. 
As can be seen from Fig. 3.7, the dose rate at the position of Phantom 1 reaches its 
maximum when the radius of the hemispherical is approximately is approximately 
250 cm.  This can be explained in the following manner.  When the cloud’s radius is 
150 cm, Phantom 1 is not yet submerged into the 131I cloud.  Only the external radiation 
from the cloud nearby has an influence on Phantom 1, resulting in a very high dose rate.  
As the radius of the cloud increases, the radiation emitted has an effect on other 
structures and phantoms.  However, the dose rate at the position of Phantom 2 never 
reaches the high values of Phantom 1, even when submerged into the cloud.  This can 
be attributed to the average concentration in the cloud decreasing as the cloud expands. 
It is also of interest to note from Fig. 3.8 that the dose rate in the position of Phantom 3 
undergoes a steep increase between radii of approximately 220 and 500 cm.   From Fig. 
3.4 it can be seen that Phantom 3 is positioned right underneath the cloud on the same 
level as the instrument gallery floor.  However, when the radius of the cloud is still 
small as shown in Fig. 3.5, the thin part of the reactor pool shielding wall (as indicated 
in Fig. 3.3) provides effective shielding to Phantom 3. Phantom 4, always standing 
outside the cloud, is receiving a more or less constant dose, which can be explained by 
the long range of ionizing γ-photons in air. 
 
3.4.3 External photon dose to eight phantoms due to complete reactor hall filled 
with 131I 
A run was also performed for the complete reactor hall being filled with a 131I gas cloud.  
As can be seen from Table 3.8, the dose rates at the positions of Phantom 1 and 2 are 
4.36 and 4.37 Sv/h, respectively whereas the dose of all the  other  phantoms  are  in  the 
Figure 3.5: A cross section of the reactor hall with a 250 cm radius 
from the pool
 
Figure 3.6: A cross section of the reactor hall with a 950 cm radius 
from the pool
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Table 3.5: External Dose rates for different computer running times for a 131I cloud 
radius of 250 cm. 
 
 Dose Rates (Sv/h) obtained for Processor Running Times 
Phantom No. 2 min 60 min 120 min 240 min 
1 1.62 x 102 1.67 x 102 1.67 x 102 1.67 x 102 
2 1.09 x 101 1.16 x 101 1.16 x 101 1.15 x 101 
3 7.48 x 10-1 8.39 x 10-1 8.46 x 10-1 8.76 x 10-1 
4 3.26 x 100 2.60 x 100 2.67 x 100 2.67 x 100 
5 1.70 x 10-1 1.44 x 10-1 1.46 x 10-1 1.41 x 10-1 
6 1.41 x 100 1.61 x 100 1.55 x 100 1.58 x 100 
7 2.36 x 10-1 3.13 x 10-1 3.25 x 10-1 3.26 x 10-1 
8 3.10 x 10-1 3.70 x 10-1 3.85 x 10-1 3.84 x 10-1 
 
Table 3.6: Errors for different computer running times for radius = 250 cm. 
 
 Errors obtained for different Processor Running Times 
Phantom No. 2 min 60 min 120 min 240 min 
1 1.5% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 
2 5.4% 1.0% 0.7% 0.5% 
3 15.4% 3.3% 2.2% 1.6% 
4 9.8% 2.0% 1.3% 0.9% 
5 29.8% 5.7% 3.8% 2.7% 
6 13.9% 2.6% 1.8% 1.2% 
7 29.1% 5.4% 3.6% 2.6% 
8 28.1% 5.2% 3.6% 2.5% 
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order of 2 – 3 mSv.  The dose due to a very short exposure time (10 minutes) was also 
calculated and it can be seen that it will be enough to result in deterministic health 
effects, considering that such effects start to take place at approximately 500 mSv.  
Indeed, for emergency planning, this may be compared to standards that exist for 
allowing emergency workers to perform certain life saving or protecting actions. 
When comparing the hemispherical scenarios results (Table 3.7) with the full dispersion 
scenario results (Table 3.8) it is evident that, in the first case, the dose rates between 
Phantom 1 and 2 are significantly different whereas in the latter case it is almost the 
same.  These two phantoms are positioned near each other.  This phenomenon can be 
explained as follows.  The exposure geometry of the hemispherical cloud is quite 
different from the full dispersion scenario.  In the case of the hemispherical scenario of 
maximum radius (950 cm), the radioactive cloud is primarily above Phantoms 1 and 2 
(see Fig. 3.6), although both phantoms are submerged in the cloud.   Phantoms 1, 
however, is nearer to the centre of the cloud and the contribution from external 
γ-radiation from all sides is substantially larger than for Phantom 2, which only receives 
a large amount of γ-radiation from one side and less, due to the geometry, from another 
side.    
In contrast, in the full dispersion scenario, the exposure geometry of both Phantoms 1 
and 2 significantly increase, since the radiation cloud is now below as well as above the 
phantoms.  However, Phantom 1, because of the reactor wall being directly underneath, 
is shielded partially from underneath.  In comparison, Phantom 2, which does receive 
radiation from underneath, receives mainly radiation from one side.  This results in the 
approximate same dose rates to these phantoms. 
As already mentioned, all the other phantoms (Phantoms 3 – 8) receive doses in the 
order of 2 – 3 mSv.  They are placed in more restricted volumes of the radiation cloud 
with all of these phantoms receiving approximately the same radiation from the main 
volume of the radiation cloud above and to one side. 
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Table 3.7: Dose rates to Phantoms 1 to 8 due to a hemispherical 131I cloud of 
varying radius. 
 
Radius of 
hemispherical 
131I cloud [cm] 
Dose Rate [Sv/h] for Phantom No. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
150 110.1 9.3 0.3 2.0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 
200 144.5 10.5 0.4 2.4 0.1 1.2 0.1 0.2 
250 166.8 11.6 0.8 2.7 0.1 1.5 0.3 0.4 
300 147.5 12.4 2.3 2.8 0.2 1.8 0.6 0.6 
500 105.2 12.9 4.1 3.0 0.2 1.9 0.9 0.6 
800 105.2 12.9 4.1 3.0 0.2 1.9 0.9 0.7 
950 105.2 12.9 4.1 3.0 0.2 1.9 0.9 0.6 
 
Table 3.8: External photon dose rate to phantoms in eight positions (see Fig. 3.4) 
for a 131I gas cloud dispersed throughout the entire reactor hall. 
 
Phantom No. Dose Rate 
(Sv/h) 
Error  
 
Dose accrued in 
10 minutes (mSv) 
1 4.36 1.48% 727 ± 10.8 
2 4.37 1.48% 728 ± 10.8 
3 2.93 1.79% 488 ± 8.7 
4 2.59 1.88% 432 ± 8.1 
5 2.61 1.85% 435 ± 8.0 
6 1.99 2.10% 332 ± 7.0 
7 2.98 1.77% 497 ± 8.8 
8 2.27 1.99% 378 ± 7.5 
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Figure 3.7: Dose rates to phantoms in positions 1 and 2 due to a hemispherical 131I 
cloud of varying radius. 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Dose Rates to phantoms in positions 2, 3 and 4 due to a hemispherical 
131I cloud of varying radius. 
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3.5 Skin dose results obtained with complete MCNP model 
In this section, β–-exposure representing the skin dose to persons at the same eight 
phantom positions are presented.  This was done for a 131I cloud of fixed radii and 
compared with the results when the complete reactor hall is filled with 131I. 
 
3.5.1 Skin dose to eight phantoms due to β–-exposure from a hemispherical 131I 
cloud of a fixed diameter of 250 cm 
Two runs, one of 480 minutes and one of 3000 minutes were performed, using the same 
geometry as indicated in Fig. 3.4.  The purpose was again to establish an optimum 
running time.  However, in contrast to the runs performed for photons in Section 3.2.1, 
it was found that the results of the phantoms near the cloud rendered good statistics.  On 
the other hand, the phantoms far away from the cloud rendered large errors, even 
despite of the relatively long running time of 3000 minutes.  This can be easily 
explained by the travel distance of electrons in air being about one metre, on average. 
Therefore, enough electrons did not “hit” the phantoms far away to provide good 
statistics.  The skin dose rates for the two runs are provided in Table 3.9.   
It can be seen that very large skin dose rates are present for Phantom 1 partially 
submerged into the cloud, with a corresponding low error. 
3.5.2 Skin dose to eight phantoms due to complete reactor hall filled with 131I 
Finally, results are presented of a 4000 minute run that was performed for the complete 
reactor hall being filled with a 131I gas cloud.  The results are shown in Table 3.10.  
Again, in order to get an indication of the skin dose to a person spending 10 minutes at 
the specified positions, the dose rates were multiplied by the exposure time and are 
presented in the last column. 
As can be seen from the results in Table 3.10, for the short time exposed the β– skin 
dose received in a single event will exceed the yearly skin dose limit of 500 mSv.  It can 
also been seen from Table 3.10 that, due to the 131I cloud that has dispersed throughout 
the reactor building resulting in a more homogeneous distribution of the electrons 
emitted from the 131I, the skin dose accrued by the phantoms in all eight positions are all 
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Table 3.9: Skin dose to eight phantoms due to a hemispherical 131I cloud of fixed 
diameter of 250 cm for two different running times. 
 
 480 minute run 3000 minute run 
Phantom 
No.  
Dose Rate 
(Sv/h) 
Error  
 
Dose Rate 
(Sv/h) 
Error  
 
1 1.32 x 103 0.4% 1.33 x 103 0.2% 
2 3.65 x 10-2 29.5% 2.84 x 10-2 14.5% 
3 2.44 x 10-3 100.0% 2.15 x 10-3 40.8% 
4 0 0.0% 1.47 x 10-3 52.7% 
5 0 0.0% 6.69 x 10-4 100.0% 
6 4.00 x 10-3 100.0% 1.83 x 10-3 51.5% 
7 0 0.0% 6.74 x 10-4 100.0% 
8 0 0.0% 4.98 x 10-4 100.0% 
 
 
Table 3.10: External β– skin dose rate to phantoms in the specified eight positions for 
a 131I gas cloud dispersed throughout the entire reactor hall (see Fig. 3.4). 
 
Phantom No. Dose Rate 
(Sv/h) 
Error  Dose accrued in 
10 minutes (mSv) 
1 4.10 2.09% 684 ± 14.3 
2 4.30 2.03% 717 ± 14.6 
3 4.08 2.08% 679 ± 14.1 
4 4.08 2.11% 679 ± 14.3 
5 4.20 2.07% 700 ± 14.5 
6 4.26 2.06% 710 ± 14.6 
7 4.01 2.10% 668 ± 14.0 
8 4.19 2.07% 698 ± 14.5 
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approximately the same.  Because of the assumption that the cloud disperses uniformly 
throughout the hall, the short travel distance of electrons does not have such a large 
influence as with the runs performed in Table 3.9 and approximately equal electrons 
“hit” the phantoms in the radiation transport performed by the MCNP code. 
It should also be noted that the external photon radiation will cause a radiation dose in 
excess of 500 mSv/h, which, on its own, will cause deterministic health effects.   
Although the electron skin dose is comparable with the external photon dose, it is not in 
the range of deterministic health effects, but only close to the yearly skin dose limit of 
500 mSv/h. 
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CHAPTER 4 – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The conclusions and recommendations resulting from the present study are presented in 
this chapter.  Finally, a conclusion on the fundamental hypothesis formulated in 
Chapter 1 is drawn. 
4.1 Conclusions from the present study 
4.1.1 Aspects related to the Safety Analysis of the MTR Reactor 
In order to properly demonstrate the use of the MCNP code, a substantial amount of 
background information, relevant to safety analysis and the physics of formation of 
radioactive inventory and the interaction of photons with matter had to be provided, and 
a real case example MTR was used to benchmark the code against.  The steps that need 
to be performed, typical data that need to be obtained and the assumptions made during 
the safety analysis process had to be shown, which includes: 
a. Obtaining the radioactive inventory  
The manner of obtaining the radioactive inventory is explained in Sections 2.4.2 and 
2.4.3 and is shown in Appendix C.1.  The assumption that was made, related to the 
radioactive inventory during the time of the accident, was that all the fuel elements are 
at a burn-up of 80% which is, as stated in the text, a conservative assumption. 
b. Release fractions and amount of fuel damaged 
The choice of a release fraction and the consideration related to that was explained in 
Section 2.5.3.  Definite assumptions, without going deeper in this field of study, were 
made in the choice of a 100% for 131I.  However, if one should choose to refine this part 
of a similar study, the influence of these assumptions could be done as part of an 
uncertainty and sensitively analysis.  Such a uncertainty and sensitively analysis would 
include the release fraction chosen as well as the percentage of the reactor core, i.e. the 
amount of fuel, that was damaged with subsequent release of radioactive isotopes.  
Uncertainty and sensitively analysis is often performed for NPPs. 
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c. The effect of emergency ventilation and the effect on different categories of 
workers in the reactor hall  
It was assumed that the normal extraction ventilation, which removes radioactive gases 
out of the building at a relatively fast rate, stops and that the emergency ventilation, 
which extracts the radioactive gases at a much slower rate come into operation.  The 
electronic instrumentation and instrumentation system is programmed in this way for 
the example MTR.  However, this protection measure, which is an engineered safety 
feature, is aimed at protecting primarily the potentially affected persons outside the 
reactor building, which includes the public, and does not necessarily take into account 
the potential exposure, which was shown to be quite high, to workers in the reactor hall. 
Among the workers in the reactor hall are emergency workers and users of the 
Experimental Beam Tube facilities on the basement floor.  However, a distinction can 
be made with regards to former and the latter categories of persons that would be 
potentially present during the time of an accident: 
i. Emergency worker 
If immediate emergency actions, to be performed by emergency workers, are 
needed, e.g. the manual coupling of emergency core cooling water to keep 
cooling the exposed reactor core due to the LOCA taking place, the potential 
exposure in such cases will be quite high, as shown by the calculations.  
Although appropriate personnel protective equipment, e.g. suitable breathing 
apparatus, would be provided to such an emergency worker to avoid the 
inhalation of 131I, such a person would still be exposed to external photon 
radiation due to the penetrating power through protective clothing of the 
energetic γ-ray photons of 131I.   
In a real emergency situation resulting from a LOCA, a direct shine path will 
develop from the reactor core with its remaining radioactive inventory if the 
emergency core cooling system could not be put into operation in time.  This 
will add to the radiation exposure of the emergency worker as the reactor pool 
water acts as a biological shield against radiation.    
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ii. Experimental Beam Tube user  
It was seen in the study that the noble gases, xenon and krypton will escape fast 
from the reactor core, through the building, to the environment due to its high 
volatility.  In addition, the 131I cloud will progress slowly, from the assumption 
of a small hemisphere, where the persons standing in the immediate vicinity (i.e. 
Phantoms 1 and 2), to the eventual scenario where the whole reactor hall is 
uniformly filled with 131I gas.  This will, therefore, allow enough time for an 
Experimental Beam Tube user to leave the building, if not trapped in the 
building due to other phenomena causing or accompanying the nuclear accident, 
e.g. in the case of a severe earthquake that caused the LOCA.  As shown by the 
calculations in Chapter 3, the Experimental Beam Tube user will have enough 
time to evacuate the reactor hall until such time that the hemispherical cloud has 
grown to its full size (radius 950 cm).  Due to ventilation extraction, it is 
estimated that such a cloud will take 30 minutes to reach size. 
d. Opinion on the safety of the reactor 
Although it was stated in the text and proven with various thermal-hydraulic 
calculations, e.g. as stated by Sharp and McCracken [SHA03] (See Section 2.1.4), that a 
hypothetical severe fuel damage event is seen as a Beyond Design Basis Accident 
(BDBA), i.e. the probability of severe fuel damage as considered in this study due to a 
LOCA, emergency planning is still needed.  Emergency planning is the fifth level of 
defence in depth (the concept that was introduced under Principle 8 of the Safety 
Fundamentals introduction in Section 1.2.1) and also explicitly required under Principle 
10.   
Therefore, emergency planning actions need to be performed under accident conditions.  
For an existing MTR, retrospective assessments can be justified to ensure that no 
emergency action that are foreseen to be performed during a severe accident will require 
a worker to spent longer than a few minutes in the reactor hall.  If the principle of 
optimization of protection, i.e. ALARA, is followed, it can follow that protecting 
systems are designed in such a way that no access to the reactor hall is required during a 
severe accident. 
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4.1.2 Appropriateness of the MCNP code 
Although being widely applied as discussed in the introduction, the MCNP code can 
also be used effectively as part of the safety analysis process as shown in this study.  
Some conditions and considerations for code to be effectively applied are discussed 
below. 
Comparison of the MCNP code with the Analytical Solution 
As explained in Section 3.1 the results of the two independent methods of MCNP and 
the Analytical Solution compare quite good.  This provides more confidence in the use 
of the MCNP code for the present study. 
Running time of MCNP code 
The MCNP code running time can be relatively long, for example as in the case for 
electron transport resulting from β–-radiation as presented in Section 3.5.2 where the 131I 
gas has uniformly dispersed into the reactor hall.  Therefore, the setting up of the 
MCNP model, performed by generating the MCNP input file, must be done with the 
aspects that influence running time in mind (e.g. the source volume, model volume, 
number of “radiation” tracks to be followed).  The runs must also be carefully selected 
as to obtain the maximum insight per run. 
Keeping the above in mind, the code can both be used for screening analyses in order to 
see where the highest expected doses are going to be and, once that is established, for 
further specific detailed calculations among which the analysis of expected emergency 
protective action doses falls. 
The limitations of β–-exposure calculations 
As seen from the present study, MCNP the code can effectively be used for external 
doses resulting from γ- radiation due to ionizing photons and can include personnel in 
most parts of the reactor hall.  However, it is only meaningful to calculate skin doses 
due to β–-exposure if the worker is immersed partly or completely in the radioactive 
cloud or if the person is within approximately one metre of the radioactive cloud. 
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4.2 Further recommendations 
Further recommendations are divided between aspects that are directly related to 
accident studies related to the present study that involves release scenarios and other 
related aspects, where the MCNP code can be applied. 
 
4.2.1 Aspects directly related to accident studies involving release scenarios of 
research reactors 
The following consideration should be kept in mind when planning to apply the MCNP 
code, together with a similar safety analysis method than presented in this study, in a 
wider manner: 
The modeling of the external dose rates from the release of other fission gases from 
the reactor core 
The volatile or semi-volatile gases expected to leak from the core during an accident, 
other than 131I can also be modelled in the same manner used for the present study.  This 
could provide additional insight to the total contribution to external radiation due to 
each isotope, and can be used as a type of a screening and sensitivity analysis.  The 
isotopes mentioned could include some of the noble gas radioisotopes of xenon and 
krypton and other halogens. 
The calculation of the complete dose 
As done in the present study, the calculations are for external radiation dose only.  The 
internal radiation dose was not determined but can be easily calculated using 
standardized methods and dose conversion factors for inhalation from, for example, 
Table II-III in the IAEA Basic Safety Series 115 [BSS96].  The code should, therefore, 
be used where external radiation dose is expected, i.e. not where the main part of the 
dose is expected to come from radioisotopes that pose an internal radiation-dose hazard 
when dispersed.  As already stated in Section 4.1.1, Subsection c, Bullet i, the inhalation 
of radioactive can be largely prevented by using suitable breathing apparatus. 
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Selection of Accident Scenario 
The particular accident scenario should be carefully selected.  As is often the practice in 
safety analysis, the “bounding scenario”, representing less-severe consequence 
accidents as well should be selected.  The physical phenomena during such an accident 
should be well studied.  This should then provide relevant input data in respect of source 
term for Level 2 analysis where the code can be applied.  This will also provide relevant 
data regarding the distribution of radioactive gas in the reactor hall that varies e.g. as a 
result of ventilation patterns that is a function of ventilation rate and ventilation design.   
Modeling in MCNP of important components that will have a larger influence on 
radiation transport 
The important components of the reactor hall geometry should be identified.  For 
example, thick shielding and other concrete walls is more important to model than small 
objects situated or standing around in the reactor hall and commensurate effort should 
be spent.  For example, the reactor pool walls and floors are more important to model 
than loose trolleys or overhead cranes. 
 
4.2.2 Other related aspects 
Other aspects such as design, standard databases and the development of visual aided 
tools are briefly described below. 
Because of the flexibility of the code, the code can be used for reactor design 
considerations.  For example, the MCNP code can be used for the selection of reactor 
shielding materials in conjunction with or as a substitution for traditional methods as 
described in e.g. [ROC82l which entails the use of various graphs, nomograms and 
tables. 
Standard geometries different types and designs of research reactors can be programmed 
into the MCNP computer code and put into databases for input into design changes and 
safety analyses when required. 
The methodology developed in this study can be used wider and more effectively for 
different designs of research reactors by using visual aided MCNP code applications.   
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4.3 Conclusion on fundamental hypothesis 
The methodology developed during the study and the MCNP model provides an 
illustration of the effective use of the MCNP code for Safety Analysis.  With 
considerations provided in this chapter it can be concluded that the MCNP code can be 
added to the existing family of modern computational techniques that are used in 
support of safety analysis of research reactors.  The technique presented in the study 
can, therefore, assist in performing advanced safety analysis and design optimizations 
that were not possible a few years ago as mentioned by Tewfik et al. [TEW08]. 
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX A – MCNP Model sketches 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1: A top cross-section view at the reactor level of the biological shield of 
SAFARI-1 as generated by the MCNP geometrical plotter. 
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Figure A.2: A top cross-section view at the level of the SAFARI-1 control room 
floor. 
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APPENDIX B  – MCNP Input File – Photon Dose – Hemisphere Radius = 250 cm 
                                                                         
c Cell Cards                                                                     
01  2  -1.21E-3   +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10          $ Air in Room (I-131 filled) 
                  +11 +12 +13 +14 +15         $ Air in Room (I-131 filled) 
                  +16 +17 +51 +52 +53         $ Air in Room (I-131 filled) 
                  +54 +55 +56 +57 +58         $ Air in Room (I-131 filled) 
                  (-1:-3:-35) (-73:72)        $ Air in Room (I-131 filled)    
                                    imp:p=1   $ Air in Room (I-131 filled)    
02  3  -2.35      +1 -2 +35         imp:p=1   $  Concrete Wall Bottom          
03  3  -2.35      +3 -4             imp:p=1   $  Concrete Wall Top             
05  3  -2.35      (-6 +5):(-5 +7)   imp:p=1   $ Lower Reactor CRT Shield 
06  3  -2.35      -8 +7             imp:p=1   $ Upper Reactor CRT Shield 
07  3  -2.35      -9                imp:p=1   $ IGF, E 
08  3  -2.35      -10               imp:p=1   $ IGF, W 
09  3  -2.35      -11               imp:p=1   $ IGF, S 
10  3  -2.35      -12               imp:p=1   $ CRF, E 
11  3  -2.35      -13               imp:p=1   $ CRF, W 
12  3  -2.35      -14               imp:p=1   $ CRF, S 
13  5  -0.9       -15               imp:p=1   $ Dry Wall, IGF, E 
14  5  -0.9       -16               imp:p=1   $ Dry Wall, IGF, W 
15  5  -0.9       -17               imp:p=1   $ Dry Wall, IGF, S 
16  6  -2.0       -18               imp:p=1   $ Glass Pane, CRF, E 
17  6  -2.0       -19               imp:p=1   $ Glass Pane, CRF, W 
18  6  -2.0       -20               imp:p=1   $ Glass Pane, CRF, S 
19  7  -2.5       -21               imp:p=1   $ Core Content 
20  7  -1.0       -22 +21           imp:p=1   $ Core Vessel Content 
21  8  -2.7       -23 +22           imp:p=1   $ Core Vessel Wall 
30  3  -2.35      -30               imp:p=1   $  Floor            
31  7  -1.0       -31 -7 +23        imp:p=1   $ Pool water 
51  1  -1.0       -51               imp:p=1   $ Phantom 1 
52  1  -1.0       -52               imp:p=1   $ Phantom 2 
53  1  -1.0       -53               imp:p=1   $ Phantom 3 
54  1  -1.0       -54               imp:p=1   $ Phantom 4 
55  1  -1.0       -55               imp:p=1   $ Phantom 5 
56  1  -1.0       -56               imp:p=1   $ Phantom 6 
57  1  -1.0       -57               imp:p=1   $ Phantom 7 
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58  1  -1.0       -58                      imp:p=1   $ Phantom 8 
72  2  -1.21E-3   (+73 -72 +55):(-7 +31)   imp:p=1   $ HemiSphere 
80  2  -1.21E-3   +2 +4 +30 -80            imp:p=1   $ Outer Air 
99  0             +80                      imp:p=0   $ Umwelt (Outer world)          
                                                                              
c Surface cards                                                                  
01  RPP  -1196.7  1497.0  -1572.0  1756.4   -31.5  1207.9      $  Inner Box Bottom                     
02  RPP  -1226.7  1527.0  -1602.0  1786.4   -31.5  1237.9      $  Outer Box Bottom   
03  RPP  -1196.7  1131.3   -989.0   989.0  1237.9  2361.1      $  Inner Box Top                
04  RPP  -1226.7  1161.3  -1019.0  1019.0  1237.9  2391.1      $  Outer Box Top                        
05  RPP  -1196.7   243.7   -304.6   304.6   -31.5   537.4      $ Thick, Lower Reactor Concrete Shield, Outer 
06  RCC   0.0  0.0 -31.5     0.0     0.0  +568.9    483.4      $ Round, Thick Lower Reactor Shield, Outer 
07  RPP  -1196.7   238.7   -152.4   152.4   -31.5   830.7      $ Inner wall, Reactor Pool 
08  RPP  -1196.7   345.4   -259.1   259.1   537.4   830.7      $ Thin, Upper Reactor Concrete Shield, Outer 
09  RPP  -1196.7  1497.0    989.0  1756.4   458.7   537.4      $ Instrument Gallery Floor, East 
10  RPP  -1196.7  1497.0  -1572.0  -989.0   458.7   537.4      $ Instrument Gallery Floor, West 
11  RPP   1131.3  1497.0   -989.0  +989.0   458.7   537.4      $ Instrument Gallery Floor, South 
12  RPP  -1196.7  1497.0    989.0  1756.4   790.1   830.7      $ Contol Room Floor, East 
13  RPP  -1196.7  1497.0  -1572.0  -989.0   790.1   830.7      $ Contol Room Floor, West 
14  RPP   1131.3  1497.0   -989.0  +989.0   790.1   830.7      $ Contol Room Floor, South 
15  RPP  -1196.7  1282.2   1139.0  1140.0   537.4   790.1      $ Dry Wall for Instrument Gallery, East 
16  RPP  -1196.7  1282.2  -1140.0 -1139.0   537.4   790.1      $ Dry Wall for Instrument Gallery, West 
17  RPP   1281.2  1282.2  -1139.0  1139.0   537.4   790.1      $ Dry Wall for Instrument Gallery, South 
18  RPP  -1196.7  1132.3    989.0   990.0   830.7  1207.9      $ GlassPane, Control Room Floor, East 
19  RPP  -1196.7  1132.3   -990.0  -989.0   830.7  1207.9      $ GlassPane, Control Room Floor, West 
20  RPP   1131.3  1132.3   -989.0   989.0   830.7  1207.9      $ GlassPane, Control Room Floor, South 
21  RPP    -30.0    30.0    -30.0    30.0     0.0    60.0      $ CoreBox - Outer Dimensions Only 
22  RCC   0.0 0.0  -29.5      0.0     0.0   200.0    60.0      $ Core Vessel 
23  RCC   0.0 0.0  -31.5      0.0     0.0   205.08   62.5      $ Core Vessel Outer 
30  RPP  -1226.7  1527.0  -1602.0  1786.4   -100    -31.5      $  Floor 
31  PZ    800.0                                                $ Water upper level 
35  RPP  -1196.7  1131.3   -989.0   989.0  1207.9  1237.9      $  Air space to fill gap                
c ========================================================================= 
51  RCC    0.0   620.0   -31.0       0.0   0.0  170.0    11.5  $ Phantom 1 
52  RCC    0.0  1000.0   -31.0       0.0   0.0  170.0    11.5  $ Phantom 2 
53  RCC    0.0  1500.0   -31.0       0.0   0.0  170.0    11.5  $ Phantom 3 
54  RCC    0.0   360.0   540.0       0.0   0.0  170.0    11.5  $ Phantom 4 
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55  RCC    0.0   200.0   832.0       0.0   0.0  170.0    11.5     $ Phantom 5 
56  RCC    0.0   630.0   832.0       0.0   0.0  170.0    11.5     $ Phantom 6 
57  RCC    0.0  1300.0   832.0       0.0   0.0  170.0    11.5     $ Phantom 7 
58  RCC    0.0  1300.0   540.0       0.0   0.0  170.0    11.5     $ Phantom 8 
c ========================================================================= 
72  S    0  0  830.7  250                                         $  Sphere 
73  PZ   830.7                                                    $  Bottom plane Hemisphere     
80  RPP  -1326.7  1627.0  -1702.0  1886.4   -200     2491.1       $  Border of outer air space 
 
c Data Cards 
c Mode: transport photons 
mode p 
sdef par=p erg=d4 x=d1 y=d2 z=d3 cel=72 
si1   -300 300  $ Sampling of source point along X-coordinate: sample from X.min to X.max 
sp1   0   1     $ Probability of sampling of source point along X-coordinate 
si2   -300 300  $ Sampling of source point along Y-coordinate: sample from Y.min to Y.max 
sp2   0   1     $ Probability of sampling of source point along Y-coordinate 
si3   +800  1130.7   $ Sampling of source point along Z-coordinate: sample from Z.min to Z.max 
sp3   0   1     $ Probability of sampling of source point along Z-coordinate 
si4 L  2.946E-02  2.978E-02  8.018E-02  1.772E-01  2.843E-01  3.258E-01  & 
       3.645E-01  5.030E-01  6.370E-01  6.427E-01  7.229E-01 
sp4    1.400E-02  2.590E-02  2.620E-02  2.650E-03  6.060E-02  2.510E-03  & 
       8.120E-01  3.610E-03  7.270E-02  2.200E-03  1.800E-02  
c Material Data 
m1   8000    -6.143E-01     &      $ TEM = Tissue-Equivalent Material 
     6000    -2.286E-01     &      $ TEM  
     1000    -1.000E-01     &      $ TEM   
     7000    -2.571E-02     &      $ TEM  
    20000    -1.429E-02     &      $ TEM  
    15000    -1.114E-02     &      $ TEM  
    19000    -2.000E-03     &      $ TEM  
    16000    -2.000E-03     &      $ TEM  
    11000    -1.429E-03     &      $ TEM  
    17000    -1.357E-03     &      $ TEM  
    12000    -2.714E-04     &      $ TEM  
    26000    -6.000E-05            $ TEM  
m2   6000    -1.24E-4       &      $ Air, dry.  Density = 1.205E-03 g/cc 
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     7000    -0.755267      &      $ Air, dry.   
     8000    -0.231781      &      $ Air, dry.   
    18000    -0.012827             $ Air, dry.   
m3   1000    -0.013         &      $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
     8000    -1.165         &      $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
    11000    -0.040         &      $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
    12000    -0.010         &      $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
    13000    -0.108         &      $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
    14000    -0.740         &      $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
    16000    -0.003         &      $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
    19000    -0.045         &      $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
    20000    -0.196         &      $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
    26000    -0.030                $ Type 04 Ordinary Concrete 
m4  26000    +1.0                  $ Iron 
m5   6000    +1                    $ Wood (DryWall) 
     1000    +2                    $ Wood (DryWall) 
m6  14000    +1                    $ Glass 
     8000    +2                    $ Glass 
m7   1000    +2                    $ Water 
     8000    +1                    $ Water 
m8  13000    -1.0                  $ Aluminium 
c 
c =================================== 
c **** Physics Table ***** 
phys:p  20   &   $  Emax 
         0   &   $  If 0, generation on; (DEFAULT); If 1 generation is off. 
         0   &   $  If 1, coherent scattering is turned off. 
         0   &   $  If 0,  photonuclear particle production is turned off (DEFAULT). 
         1       $  If 1, Doppler energy broadening is turned off (DEFAULT). 
phys:e  20   &   $  Emax 
         0   &   $  0 always 
         0   &   $  0 always 
         0   &   $  0 always 
         0   &   $  0 always 
         1   &   $  1 always 
         1   &   $  1 always 
         1   &   $  1 always 
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         1   &   $  1 always 
         0       $  0 always (Bremsstrahlung production treatment; 0 is more accurate; 1 is faster.) 
c ============= 
c 
fc16 Photon Absorbed Dose Rate inside the Phantoms 
+f16  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  $ was 2 spaces 
fm16  6.2409E9    
c 
c ============== 
PRINT  10  40  50  60  72  100  110  120  170  200 
c ============== 
ctme 240 
 
 
Comments 
Sum of photon yields for I-131 = 1.0404 (ICRP-38) 
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APPENDIX C – Radioactive inventory – ORIGEN-S run output 
 
Table C.1: ORIGEN-S run output data set calculating radioactive inventory in the fuel 
elements of SAFARI-1. 
Fuel type LEU-Silicide fuel (U3Si2) 
Enrichment 19,75% 235U 
Burn-up 80% or 180 MWD 
Burn-up rate 20 MW 
 
Name of group related to 
chemical compounds that 
form 
Nuclide 26 LEU Fuel Elements Inventory (Bq) 
1. Noble gas 
83m
 Kr 1.60 x 1015 
85Kr 6.97 x 1013 
85m
 Kr 3.82 x 1015 
87Kr 7.31 x 1015 
88Kr 1.03 x 1016 
131m
 Xe 1.20 x 1014 
133Xe 2.23 x 1016 
133m
 Xe 6.92 x 1014 
135Xe 2.86 x 1015 
135m
 Xe 4.24 x 1015 
2.  I2, CsI, HBr 
82Br 2.50 x 1013 
83Br 1.60 x 1015 
84Br 2.83 x 1015 
128I 4.55 x 1013 
129I 1.36 x 108 
130I 5.04 x 1012 
131I 1.04 x 1016 
132I 1.52 x 1016 
133I 2.29 x 1016 
134I 2.52 x 1016 
135I 2.13 x 1016 
3.  CsOH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134Cs 5.07 x 1014 
134m
 Cs 3.20 x 1014 
135Cs 1.09 x 109 
135m
 Cs 2.14 x 1014 
136Cs 1.95 x 1014 
137Cs 6.06 x 1014 
138Cs 2.18 x 1016 
24Na 1.79 x 1014 
28Al 2.33 x 1016 
31Si 1.28 x 1013 
32Si 6.40 x 103 
32P 2.76 x 109 
33P 3.17 x 104 
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Name of group related to 
chemical compounds that 
form 
Nuclide 26 LEU Fuel Elements Inventory (Bq) 
4.  TeO2 and Sb2O3 
 
125m
 Te 6.45 x 1012 
127Te 7.07 x 1014 
127m
 Te 9.41 x 1013 
129Te 2.76 x 1015 
129m
 Te 4.42 x 1014 
131Te 9.07 x 1015 
131m
 Te 1.44 x 1015 
132Te 1.50 x 1016 
133Te 1.28 x 1016 
133m
 Te 9.65 x 1015 
134Te 2.05 x 1016 
122Sb 3.72 x 1012 
124Sb 1.46 x 1012 
125Sb 3.69 x 1013 
126Sb 5.46 x 1012 
126m
 Sb 3.59 x 1012 
127Sb 7.12 x 1014 
128Sb 9.98 x 1013 
128m
 Sb 1.45 x 1015 
129Sb 2.76 x 1015 
130Sb 9.46 x 1014 
131Sb 8.71 x 1015 
5.  SrO and BaO 
 
87m Sr 1.70 x 1010 
89Sr 1.68 x 1016 
90Sr 5.49 x 1014 
91Sr 1.73 x 1016 
92Sr 1.77 x 1016 
135m
 Ba 3.72 x 1010 
136m
 Ba 3.22 x 1013 
137m
 Ba 5.75 x 1014 
139Ba 2.12 x 1016 
140Ba 2.15 x 1016 
6.  RuO4 and MoO3 
 
99Mo 2.06 x 1016 
103Ru 1.47 x 1016 
105Ru 6.86 x 1015 
106Ru 1.75 x 1015 
99Tc 7.90 x 1010 
99m
 Tc 1.81 x 1016 
7.  La2O3 and CeO2 
 
140La 2.25 x 1016 
141La 1.94 x 1016 
142La 1.92 x 1016 
151Sm 6.84 x 1012 
153Sm 3.20 x 1015 
155Sm 2.24 x 1014 
156Sm 1.27 x 1014 
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Name of group related to 
chemical compounds that 
form 
Nuclide 26 LEU Fuel Elements Inventory (Bq) 
7.  La2O3 and CeO2  
(Cont.) 
 
158Sm 3.64 x 1013 
147Pm 1.21 x 1015 
148Pm 2.68 x 1015 
148m
 Pm 3.35 x 1014 
149Pm 7.38 x 1015 
150Pm 1.61 x 1014 
151Pm 1.72 x 1015 
142Pr 4.52 x 1014 
143Pr 1.91 x 1016 
144Pr 1.34 x 1016 
144m
 Pr 1.59 x 1014 
145Pr 1.26 x 1016 
146Pr 9.72 x 1015 
90Y 5.82 x 1014 
90m Y 1.39 x 1011 
91Y 2.11 x 1016 
91m Y 1.00 x 1016 
92Y 1.78 x 1016 
93Y 1.95 x 1016 
147Nd 7.96 x 1015 
149Nd 3.87 x 1015 
141Ce 2.15 x 1016 
142Ce 1.64 x 105 
143Ce 1.90 x 1016 
144Ce 1.32 x 1016 
95Zr 2.46 x 1016 
97Zr 1.96 x 1016 
95Nb 2.63 x 1016 
95m
 Nb 1.75 x 1014 
96Nb 3.59 x 1013 
97Nb 1.98 x 1016 
97m
 Nb 1.86 x 1016 
98m
 Nb 1.49 x 1014 
8.  NpO2 and PuO2 
 
238Np 1.37 x 1015 
239Np 1.07 x 1017 
240Np 2.26 x 1014 
238Pu 2.83 x 1012 
239Pu 1.05 x 1012 
240Pu 9.33 x 1011 
241Pu 2.50 x 1014 
242Pu 1.98 x 109 
243Pu 3.43 x 1014 
237U 6.71 x 1015 
239U 1.07 x 1017 
   
